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CRUEL AND UNEQUAL PUNISHMENTS 
NITA A. FARAHANY∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that Atkins v. Virginia and its progeny of 
categorical exemptions to the death penalty create a new and as of yet 
undiscovered interaction between the Eighth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. When the United States Supreme 
Court adapted its proportionality analysis from categories of crime to 
categories of people, it abandoned intrajurisdictional analysis, a de facto 
equality consideration under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
The Court, the legal academy, and commentators have failed to consider 
the remarkable equal protection implications of this doctrinal shift. To see 
the point in practice, one need only consider two criminal defendants: the 
first was mentally retarded from birth; the second suffered a traumatic 
brain injury at the age of twenty-two; and both have identical cognitive, 
behavioral, and adaptive impairments. Under state statutes cited 
approvingly in Atkins and others enacted since, the first defendant cannot 
be executed, but the second one can. This seems wrong on its face, but to 
understand why, it is necessary to explore the interaction of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The doctrinal shift in Atkins has profoundly 
altered that interaction, putting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause in tension with the Equal Protection Clause. This Article illustrates 
that conflict, and how legislative classifications adopted pursuant to 
categorical exemptions under the Eighth Amendment may now be subject 
to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 1, 1996, at the age of twenty-two, Gregory Brown 
suffered a traumatic brain injury,1 damaging the right frontal lobe and 
temporal regions of his brain.2 Less than three years later, Brown 
committed a double homicide.3 On May 7, 2002, Brown received the death 
penalty for those crimes.4 
On appeal, Brown argued that the execution of a man with a serious 
brain injury would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.5 He relied 
upon Atkins v. Virginia,6 in which the Court held that executing people 
with mental retardation violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
 
 
 1. State v. Brown, 907 So. 2d 1, 32 (La. 2005). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 6. 
 4. Id. at 11. 
 5. Id. at 30. 
 6. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Brown presented compelling expert 
evidence that his cognitive, behavioral, and adaptive functioning met the 
criteria identified by the Court. But the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected 
his claim. Mental retardation, the court explained, is a “disability 
characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and 
adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical 
adaptive skills. The onset must occur before the age of eighteen years.”7 
Brown’s injury occurred when he was twenty-two.  
The Court has invited just this sort of unequal and arbitrary result 
through its new Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Atkins, the Court 
applied an abbreviated form of its Eighth Amendment proportionality 
analysis with significant constitutional implications that have, as of yet, 
gone unnoticed. Before Atkins, successful Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis focused on the proportionality between crime and 
punishment. The Court, for example, has found the death penalty to be 
disproportionate to the crime of adult rape,8 and the sentence of cadena 
temporal9 to be disproportionate to the crime of false entry in 
bookkeeping. But the Court’s new proportionality jurisprudence focuses 
on the proportionality between offenders’ culpability and punishment. The 
Court in Atkins deemed the death penalty disproportionate to the 
culpability of the mentally retarded, the relevant class of offenders, 
irrespective of the crime they had committed.10  
In the course of this momentous but unremarked shift, the Court 
abandoned an integral part of its earlier proportionality analysis. In earlier 
Eighth Amendment cases, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a 
punishment for a particular crime, in part, by engaging in an 
intrajurisdictional analysis—comparing the punishment for similar crimes 
within the same jurisdiction. But when the Court shifted from punishment-
to-crime proportionality to punishment-to-culpability proportionality, this 
previously essential step got lost in the analysis. In Atkins, the Court 
abandoned intrajurisdictional review and therefore failed to ask or answer 
whether similarly culpable individuals received the same or less harsh 
punishment when committing the same crime as the class of offenders at 
issue. 
 
 
 7. Brown, 907 So. 2d at 31. 
 8. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 9. The punishment of cadena temporal included imprisonment for at least twelve years and one 
day, in chains, while serving hard labor to the state. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 364 
(1910). 
 10. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–21. 
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This failure has grave implications for equality. Had the Court 
conducted an intrajurisdictional analysis it would have defined the class of 
offenders at issue, and those outside the class, but similar with respect to 
the legal purpose of the constitutional interest at issue. By failing to 
conduct an intrajurisdictional analysis, the Court instead ignored the 
contours of the class of individuals who should be considered legally 
mentally retarded. The result has been unequal and arbitrary legislative 
classifications of mental retardation, like the one applied in Brown’s case 
by Louisiana, which strip the Eighth Amendment of the equality the Court 
had previously ensured and may run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Other scholars have argued that Atkins should be extended to other 
categories or groups of individuals in future Eighth Amendment cases.11 
But under current doctrine, these other groups have a far weaker Eighth 
Amendment claim. The Court has held that “cruel and unusual 
punishments” are defined by our “evolving standards of decency,”12 which 
the Court has gleaned from national consensus against a particular 
punishment or against executing a particular class of offenders.13 But 
while the Court found a national consensus about executing the medically 
defined mentally retarded, no such consensus exists for other medically 
identical conditions. Indeed, these other conditions have far less powerful 
interest groups and a much lower public profile, such that a national 
consensus against executing those individuals is unlikely to emerge.  
Meanwhile, another scholar has argued that although the mentally ill 
lack an Eighth Amendment claim, they may nevertheless have an equal 
 
 
 11. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the 
Volitionally Incapacitated and the Death Penalty, 55 S.C. L. REV. 93 (2003) (arguing that there ought 
to be a categorical exception from the death penalty for individuals with mental illness because mental 
disorders diminish culpability in a significant way); Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and Criminal 
Culpability After Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 355 (2004) (questioning how execution of 
the mentally retarded can be justified by reference to the nature of the mentally retarded defendant’s 
cognitive impairment while applying a different standard to a mentally ill defendant with functionally 
identical cognitive impairments); Laurie T. Izutsu, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Capital Defendants 
with Severe Mental Illness, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 995 (2005) (proposing a categorical exemption from 
capital punishment for individuals with severe mental disorders because offenders with severe mental 
illnesses, although not intellectually impaired, suffer from cognitive and behavioral impairments 
analogous to the deficiencies experienced by defendants with mental retardation found less culpable in 
Atkins).  
 12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 13. The national consensus is usually based on either a count of state legislative enactments, 
together with jury opinions and sometimes public opinion polls. The Court has sometimes, 
controversially, relied upon practice in foreign countries for support as well. See generally cases and 
discussion in Part I, infra. 
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protection claim.14 This analysis is also flawed. Under current equal 
protection doctrine, the distinction between the mentally retarded and 
mentally ill would receive only rational basis or perhaps an intermediate 
level of scrutiny because neither the mentally retarded nor the mentally ill 
have suspect class status, and the distinction between them would be 
analyzed accordingly.15 Most legislative classifications easily satisfy this 
low level of constitutional review.  
Finally, all of these arguments fail to address the fundamental changes 
in the constitutional landscape created by Atkins itself. Atkins marked the 
first success in the Court’s attempt to shift its proportionality inquiry from 
categories of crime to categories of people, resulting in legislative schemes 
that newly entitle some—and exclude others—from the safeguard against 
the imposition of death at the hands of the government. It is this shift that 
could implicate the Fourteenth Amendment—and, indeed, trigger 
heightened judicial review. 
In short, both the Court and the academy have failed to grasp the full 
implications of Atkins because they have failed to consider the potential 
collision course that the Court may have now created between the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. This 
Article illustrates this conflict and demonstrates how the Court’s new 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence could result in remarkable Fourteenth 
Amendment implications. Thus, this Article demonstrates why the Court’s 
failure to define the substantive class of mental retardation in Atkins has 
led to legislative classifications of mental retardation that ensure unequal 
outcomes under the Eighth Amendment and could run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And how the dual failure 
of the Atkins Court—to apply faithfully its Eighth Amendment 
proportionality precedent, and to define the class it newly protected—may 
have invited these underinclusive legislative classifications. 
To see the point in practice, one need only consider two criminal 
defendants: the first was mentally retarded from birth; the second suffered 
a traumatic brain injury at the age of twenty-two; and both have identical 
cognitive, behavioral, and adaptive impairments. Under state statutes cited 
approvingly in Atkins and others enacted since, the first defendant cannot 
be executed, but the second one can. This seems inequitable on its face, 
 
 
 14. See Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People With Mental Illness, 33 N.M. 
L. REV. 293 (2003) (arguing that there is no rational basis to distinguish between the mentally ill and 
the mentally retarded, and the execution of the mentally ill should be banned via the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 15. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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but to understand the implications in law, it is necessary to explore the 
interaction of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The doctrinal shift 
in Atkins has profoundly altered that interaction, inviting a new doctrinal 
discourse. 
Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis from its inception in punishment-to-crime cases 
through its more recent punishment-to-culpability cases, revealing the 
abandonment of critical elements of earlier proportionality analysis. Part II 
reviews the legislative enactments promulgated and sustained in response 
to Atkins, and demonstrates how the Court’s dual failure in Atkins resulted 
in the codification of medical diagnostic criteria rather than a more robust 
legal standard. Part III then details medical conditions with nearly 
identical clinical manifestations as the medically defined category 
“mentally retarded,” that would also satisfy the criteria the Court identified 
as the key attributes relevant to their diminished culpability, but that are 
excluded from statutory definitions of mental retardation adopted pursuant 
to Atkins. By and large, courts reject Eighth Amendment claims by these 
defendants, relying on the safe harbor the Court created as support. The 
striking similarity between the conditions discussed in Part III and the 
medically defined category “mentally retarded” make plain the 
arbitrariness of legislative classifications that turn on identifying a class of 
persons by medical diagnostic criteria. Finally, Part IV explains how the 
Court’s abandonment of intrajurisdictional analysis invited these narrow 
legislative schemes, and put the Eighth Amendment on a collision course 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Legislative classifications of mental retardation may be newly subject to 
equality challenges as artificially or arbitrarily narrowing the class of 
individuals entitled to exercise the right to be free from execution.16 The 
Court’s abandonment of intrajurisdictional analysis enabled the adoption 
of legislative classifications based on medical diagnostic criteria. These 
schemes may now be subject to searching judicial review.17 This could 
 
 
 16. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a 
statute authorizing the sterilization of some convicts because it arbitrarily classified persons as 
“habitual offenders” where a fundamental right was at issue); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 575 (4th ed. 1991) (“[T]he Court often employs the strict scrutiny 
compelling interest test in reviewing legislation which limits fundamental constitutional rights. . . . 
Because equal protection problems involve classifications rather than the limitations of rights for all 
persons, the Court is sometimes called upon to exercise strict scrutiny of legislation because of 
classifying traits employed by the legislature rather than the nature of the right touched upon by the 
legislative act.”). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that 
there may be a narrower presumption of constitutionality of legislation when it touches upon a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/2
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have profound implications for the legal definition of mental retardation in 
capital cases, and for the future direction of categorical exemptions to the 
death penalty. In no other area has the Court’s seemingly progressive 
jurisprudence resulted in such disparate results. 
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Since Weems v. United States,18 the United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment in a “flexible and dynamic manner.”19 In Weems, the Court 
focused its cruel and unusual punishments analysis on the proportion 
between the punishment and the offense. It thereby rejected the 
proposition that the clause applies only to the barbarous methods of 
punishment that were outlawed in the eighteenth century.20 In particular, 
the Court found the sentence of cadena temporal21 for false entry in 
bookkeeping to be “cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which 
accompanies and follows imprisonment[, and] unusual in its character.”22  
The Court based its decision on an interjurisdictional and an 
intrajurisdictional comparative analysis. First, the Court conducted an 
interjurisdictional analysis—by comparing the punishment-to-crime 
proportion in the Philippines, the jurisdiction in which the claim arose, to 
 
 
fundamental right protected by the Constitution); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 328 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority’s application of 
rational basis review to Virginia’s scheme for determining mental retardation for execution was 
inappropriate because “‘when state laws impinge on personal rights protected in the Constitution,’ 
strict scrutiny—not rational-basis review—is warranted. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
the cruel and unusual punishment embodied by the execution of the mentally retarded is surely a 
fundamental, personal constitutional right.” (citations omitted)); see also Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46, 84 (1947), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) 
(holding that the Supreme Court had held that freedom from, “at the very least, certain types of cruel 
and usual punishment” was a fundamental right); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 
464 (1947) (holding that “[t]he cruelty against which the [Eighth Amendment] protects a convicted 
man is the cruelty inherent in the method of punishment”); Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, No. 946, 1900 WL 
129761, at *7 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 7, 1900) (“[T]here are certain fundamental rights of person and property, 
even in this District, that are beyond the power of Congress to disregard or violate. The rights secured 
to persons and property by the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution are among such 
rights.”). 
 18. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).  
 19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 20. Weems, 217 U.S. at 368 (“What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not been 
exactly decided. It has been said that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, 
torture and the like. The Court, however, . . . [has] conceded the possibility ‘that imprisonment in the 
State prison for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel 
and unusual punishment.’”) (citations omitted). 
 21. See supra note 9. 
 22. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377. 
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the same punishment-to-crime proportion in other jurisdictions. More 
specifically, it compared the cadena temporal-to-false bookkeeping 
proportion from the Philippines to other punishment-to-false bookkeeping 
proportions in the U.S. Code.23 Next, it conducted an intrajurisdictional 
analysis—comparing the punishment-to-crime proportion in the 
Philippines to the punishment-to-crime proportions of similar and related 
crimes in the Philippines.24 It found that false bookkeeping was treated 
considerably more harshly than other similar types of fraud in the 
Philippines. “And this contrast,” the Court said, “shows more than 
different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It 
condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual.”25  
The Court would expand the breadth of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause more dramatically still, most notably in the 1958 
landmark case of Trop v. Dulles.26 The Trop plurality interpreted Weems 
to mean the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is not static but 
“draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”27 Although Trop focused on the 
unconstitutionality of a method of punishment—denationalization28—
rather than the proportionality of punishment, it holds a pivotal role in 
Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence.29  
 
 
 23. Id. at 380 (“There are degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely, nor are the 
following crimes: misprision of treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to destroy the Government by 
force, recruiting soldiers in the United States to fight against the United States, forgery of letters 
patent, forgery of bonds and other instruments for the purpose of defrauding the United States, 
robbery, larceny, and other crimes.”). 
 24. Id. at 381 (“[T]he highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss of many 
thousand of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the State should be as eager as to prevent the 
perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a 
single item of a public account.”). 
 25. Id.  
 26. 356 U.S. 86 (1958); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Military Law Relevant to “Evolving 
Standards of Decency” Embodied in the Eighth Amendment?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 140, 
142 (2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court altered the course of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
when it held that punishment must comport with, ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.’”). 
 27. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
 28. The defendant, a private in the United States Army, was charged with desertion. Id. at 87. As 
a result of his desertion, he lost his rights of citizenship. Id. at 88–90. The Court found the punishment 
to be cruel in that it was “more primitive than torture,” and “offensive to cardinal principles for which 
the Constitution stands.” Id. at 101–02. The Court found the practice unusual because “civilized 
nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for 
crime.” Id. at 102. The Court therefore concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
denationalization for the crime of desertion. Id. at 103. 
 29. Id. at 99 (“Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the 
penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/2
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This became evident shortly thereafter when the Court intertwined the 
Trop and Weems analyses into a single inquiry, in the case of Gregg v. 
Georgia.30 In effect, the Court expanded the first part of its Trop approach 
to include proportionality,31 and hinged unusualness on a finding of 
objective evidence of contemporary standards.32 Proportionality thereafter 
became a subset of an evolving standard of decency doctrine, rather than a 
stand-alone test.  
The Court applied this intertwined approach to the issue before it—
whether the death penalty for the crime of murder was a per se violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.33 First, the Court analyzed the cruelty of the 
punishment by asking whether it comported with the “basic concept of 
human dignity at the core of the Amendment.”34 And it newly articulated 
that the penological justifications for the punishment would inform the 
cruelty of a punishment.35 Here, the retributive and deterrent rationales of 
the death penalty justified legislative decisions to employ it.36 The Court 
also considered the unusualness of death as a punishment, looking to 
historical accounts of the use and acceptance of the death penalty in the 
United States, including discussions by the Framers of the Constitution 
and by the Court in past precedents.37 As part of this inquiry, the Court 
employed interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional analyses to asses the 
punishment-to-crime proportionality, and found the proportion 
constitutionally permissible.38 Through an interjurisdictional analysis, the 
Court found an apparent societal endorsement for the death penalty, 
evinced by legislative enactments and jury decisions outside Georgia.39 
 
 
 30. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379–80 (1989) (“[W]e 
have never invalidated a punishment on [proportionality] alone. All of our cases condemning a 
punishment [as disproportionate] . . . also found that the objective indicators of state laws or jury 
determinations evidenced a societal consensus against that penalty. . . . In fact, the two methodologies 
blend into one another, since ‘proportionality’ analysis itself can only be conducted on the basis of the 
standards set by our own society; the only alternative, once again, would be our personal 
preferences.”) (citations omitted). 
 31. For a punishment to comport with “the dignity of man,” and thereby avoid being cruel, the 
Court said, it cannot be excessive. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. And excessiveness requires that the 
punishment avoid “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and “not be grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion). 
 32. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (“[T]he constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of 
contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards.”). 
 33. Id. at 176. 
 34. Id. at 182 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100). 
 35. Id. at 182–83. 
 36. Id. at 183–87. 
 37. See id. at 176–79. 
 38. Id. at 187. 
 39. Id. at 179–82. 
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And through its intrajurisdictional analysis, the Court agreed that the most 
extreme punishment was constitutionally permissible for murder, the most 
extreme crime in that or any other jurisdiction.40 
The Court refined this intertwined analysis when it next addressed a 
punishment-to-crime challenge in Coker v. Georgia.41 In Coker, a plurality 
of the Court announced a novel formulation of its Eighth Amendment 
punishment inquiry, but that formulation actually reflects a refinement of 
one aspect of the Gregg test. The Court stated that the constitutionality of 
a punishment turns on whether that punishment (1) senselessly inflicts 
pain without a penological purpose; or (2) is “grossly out of proportion to 
the severity of the crime.”42 And to avoid “Eighth Amendment judgments” 
about the proportion of punishment to crime from being, or appearing to 
be, “merely the subjective views of individual Justices,” the plurality 
stated that these judgments must be guided by objective factors.43 Relevant 
objective indicia include public attitudes concerning a sentence history and 
precedent, legislative attitudes, and jury attitudes reflected in their 
sentencing decisions.44  
How it applied this two-part objective/subjective analysis in Coker 
became the template for later capital punishment proportionality cases. 
First, the plurality conducted an “objective” interjurisdictional analysis—
one guided by external trends rather than the Court’s judgment—to inform 
the “country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a 
penalty for rape of an adult woman.”45 It detailed the number of state 
legislatures that made rape a capital offense after Gregg.46 It also cited jury 
verdicts imposing the death penalty for adult rape, and found that nine out 
of ten juries chose not to impose death sentences in cases of adult rape.47 
The objective evidence supported a conclusion that contemporary society 
viewed the death penalty as disproportionate to adult rape. But, these 
objective indicators “do not wholly determine this controversy,” claimed 
the Court, “for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the 
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”48 
 
 
 40. Id. at 187. 
 41. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 42. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 593. 
 46. Id. at 593–96. 
 47. Id. at 596–97.  
 48. Id. at 597. 
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The Court then engaged in a subjective inquiry—based on the 
independent judgment of the Justices—about the constitutionality of 
proportionality between the death penalty and adult rape. They based their 
subjective inquiry on (1) the comparative gravity of the offense between 
rape and other crimes subject to the death penalty,49 and (2) an 
intrajurisdictional analysis comparing the death penalty to rape proportion 
to other similar punishment-to-crime proportions in Georgia.50 Based on 
its objective and subjective analysis, the Court struck down as 
unconstitutional the death sentence for adult rape.51 
Rummel v. Estelle52 cast doubt on whether the Gregg/Coker approach 
(hereinafter the “Coker reformulation”) would succeed outside of the 
capital sentencing context. By then it was clear that the Court disagreed 
over whether the Eighth Amendment included a proportionality principle. 
Rummel challenged Texas’s authority to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment, with the possibility of parole, for a third felony under the 
state recidivist statute sentencing scheme.53 In a 5–4 opinion for the 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “[b]ecause a sentence of 
death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how 
long, our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the 
constitutionality of the punishment meted out to Rummel.”54  
 
 
 49. Id. at 597–98 (“[Rape] is highly reprehensible. . . . Short of homicide, it is the ‘ultimate 
violation of self.’ It is also a violent crime. . . . Because it undermines the community’s sense of 
security, there is public injury as well. Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but . . . 
it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 50.   
[U]nder Georgia law, death may not be imposed for any capital offense, including rape, 
unless the jury or judge finds one of the statutory aggravating circumstances and then elects 
to impose that sentence. . . . For the rapist to be executed in Georgia, it must therefore be 
found not only that he committed rape but also that one or more . . . aggravating 
circumstances were present . . . [I]n Georgia a person commits murder when he unlawfully 
and with malice aforethought . . . causes the death of another human being. He also commits 
that crime when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of another human being, 
irrespective of malice. But even where the killing is deliberate, it is not punishable by death 
absent proof of aggravating circumstances. 
Id. at 598–600. 
 51. Id. at 600. 
 52. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 53. Id. at 270–71. 
 54. Id. at 272. The Court nevertheless engaged the substance of Rummel’s claim, invoking the 
Coker reformulation for support. First, the Court rejected Rummel’s interjurisdictional analysis, which 
asserted a nationwide trend against mandatory life sentences toward lighter, discretionary sentences. 
Id. at 279–84. Next, it rejected Rummel’s attempt to diminish the comparative gravity of his offense, 
both in substance, and on the merits of the judiciary engaging in such an inquiry: 
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Just two years later, in Enmund v. Florida,55 the Court applied the 
Coker reformulation to find disproportionate the death penalty “for one 
who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.”56 
The Court read the objective evidence as evincing societal condemnation 
of the death penalty for accomplice liability without intent to kill or 
recklessness.57 Its subjective inquiry focused again on the comparative 
gravity of the offense and an abbreviated intrajurisdictional analysis.58 The 
Court recharacterized Enmund’s conduct as a participant to robbery, rather 
than a robber and murderer, based on the record before it.59 Next, it 
compared the gravity of robbery to murder, since it had upheld the death 
penalty for murder in Gregg.60 Finally, looking at other punishment-to-
 
 
Rummel points to certain characteristics of his offenses that allegedly render them “petty.” He 
cites, for example, the absence of violence in his crimes. But the presence or absence of 
violence does not always affect the strength of society’s interest in deterring a particular 
crime or in punishing a particular criminal. . . . Additionally, Rummel cites the “small” 
amount of money taken in each of his crimes. But to recognize that the State of Texas could 
have imprisoned Rummel for life if he had stolen $5,000, $50,000, or $500,000, rather than 
the $120.75 that a jury convicted him of stealing, is virtually to concede that the lines to be 
drawn are indeed “subjective,” and therefore properly within the province of legislatures, not 
courts. 
Id. at 275–76. Finally, the Court rejected both the merits and propriety of interjurisdictional 
comparison in proportionality analysis:  
The dissent draws some support for its belief that Rummel’s sentence is unconstitutional by 
comparing it with punishments imposed by Texas for crimes other than those committed by 
Rummel. Other crimes, of course, implicate other societal interests, making any such 
comparison inherently speculative. Embezzlement, dealing in “hard” drugs, and forgery, to 
name only three offenses, could be denominated “property related” offenses, and yet each can 
be viewed as an assault on a unique set of societal values as defined by the political 
process. . . . The highly placed executive who embezzles huge sums from a state savings and 
loan association, causing many shareholders of limited means to lose substantial parts of their 
savings, has committed a crime very different from a man who takes a smaller amount of 
money from the same savings and loan at the point of a gun. Yet rational people could 
disagree as to which criminal merits harsher punishment. By the same token, a State cannot 
be required to treat persons who have committed three “minor” offenses less severely than 
persons who have committed one or two “more serious” offenses. If nothing else, the three-
time offender’s conduct supports inferences about his ability to conform with social norms 
that are quite different from possible inferences about first- or second-time offenders.  
Id. at 282 n.27. In the absence of objective evidence to the contrary, the majority held that Texas was 
entitled to make its own judgment as to how many years imprisonment was appropriate for a recidivist 
felon like Rummel. Id. at 295. The dissent argued that proportionality analysis in capital and 
noncapital cases alike should be informed by “(i) the nature of the offense; (ii) the sentence imposed 
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions; and (iii) the sentence imposed upon other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction.” Id. at 295 (citations omitted). 
 55. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 56. Id. at 787. 
 57. Id. at 789–96. 
 58. Id. at 797–801. 
 59. Id. at 798. 
 60. Although the Court agreed robbery was a serious offense, it concluded that “‘[i]t does not 
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crime proportions in Florida, the Court found that Enmund, who acted 
without intent to kill, was punished as harshly as the robbers who intended 
to kill.61 And this completed its analysis: the Court found the death penalty 
disproportionate to the crime or act of robbery absent the taking of human 
life.62  
In Solem v. Helm,63 the Court resurrected proportionality analysis 
outside of capital sentencing, applying a modified version of the Coker 
reformulation. Helm, who pleaded guilty to his seventh felony offense, 
challenged as cruel and unusual his sentence of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s habitual offender scheme.64 
While at first blush it again seems the Court introduced a new Eighth 
Amendment proportionality approach, closer examination reveals overlap 
with the Coker reformulation: “[A] court’s proportionality analysis under 
the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;”65 “the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;”66 and “the 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”67 The second Solem factor is the same as the Coker 
reformulation objective prong; the first and third Solem factors restate the 
 
 
compare with murder. . . . The murderer kills; the [robber], if no more than that, does not.’” Id. at 797 
(citations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 798 (“[U]nder Florida law death was an authorized penalty because Enmund aided and 
abetted a robbery in the course of which murder was committed. It is fundamental that ‘causing harm 
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.’ Enmund 
did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who 
killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the 
Kerseys.” (citations omitted)).  
 62. Id. at 797 (“[W]e have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is ‘unique in its 
severity and irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such, does not take human 
life.” (citations omitted)). 
 63. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 64. Id. at 283–84. 
 65. Id. at 292. 
First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for 
example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant’s crime in great detail. In 
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of rape, and compared it to other 
crimes, such as murder. In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the “crime.” 
And in Weems, the Court’s opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of the 
offense. Of course, a court must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether it is 
disproportionate. 
 Id. at 290–91 (citations omitted).  
 66. Id. at 292; see also id. at 291 (“Thus in Enmund the Court noted that all of the other felony 
murderers on death row in Florida were more culpable than the petitioner there. The Weems Court 
identified an impressive list of more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 292. 
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subjective prong. The majority applied all three factors—and thus both 
Coker reformulation prongs—to conclude that Helm’s sentence was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate.68  
The scope of the Court’s holding in Enmund came into question several 
years later in the case of Tison v. Arizona.69 Like Enmund, the Tisons did 
not pull the trigger that led to the death of the victims in the case. But 
unlike Enmund, their participation was “anything but minor,” and “they 
both subjectively appreciated that their acts were likely to result in the 
taking of innocent life.”70 Thus, the Court newly addressed “whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibit[ed] the death penalty in the intermediate case 
of the defendant whose participation is major and whose mental state is 
one of reckless indifference to the value of human life.”71  
The majority conducted its traditional objective interjurisdictional 
analysis.72 But because this case presented facts quite similar to Enmund, 
the second part of its analysis, the subjective prong, proceeded differently. 
Instead of analyzing the gravity of the offense and conducting its 
intrajurisdictional analysis, the Court compared the relative culpability of 
this group of offenders to the group protected by Enmund.73 Thus, the 
Court ignored one part of the Coker reformulation—or two-thirds of the 
Solem factors—and simply asked and concluded in the affirmative 
whether this group satisfied “the Enmund culpability requirement.”74 But 
the Court did not really focus on the offender’s culpability rather than the 
 
 
 68.  
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm’s sentence to determine if it is proportionate to 
his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate 
sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more harshly than other 
criminals in the State who have committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more 
harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a 
single State. We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and 
is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. at 303 
 69. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 70. Id. at 152. 
 71. Id.  
 72.  
The largest number of States still fall into the two intermediate categories discussed in 
Enmund. . . . [But, the] substantial and recent legislative authorization of the death penalty for 
the crime of felony murder regardless of the absence of a finding of an intent to kill 
powerfully suggests that our society does not reject the death penalty as grossly excessive 
under these circumstances.  
Id. at 152–54. And, apparent consensus in states that substantial participation in a violent felony under 
circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the death penalty even in 
the absence of the intent to kill. Id. at 154. 
 73. Id. at 156–58. 
 74. Id. at 158–59. 
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crime in question. As in all prior punishment-to-crime cases, the Court 
held that all persons who commit a particular crime or act—here, 
accomplice liability for felony murder, where the defendant has a 
substantial role or recklessly endangers the lives of others—are either 
constitutionally protected from or subject to a particular punishment. Thus, 
the Tison Court does not single out a category of people for special Eighth 
Amendment protection irrespective of the crime or act they have 
committed.  
The four-person dissent, joined by Justice Stevens, admonished the 
majority for failing to properly apply its earlier Eighth Amendment tests.75 
It criticized the majority’s analysis as an “inadequate substitute for a 
proper proportionality analysis,” finding unpersuasive the notion “that the 
punishment that was unconstitutional for Enmund is constitutional for the 
Tisons.”76 The essence of an Eighth Amendment proportionality inquiry, 
the dissent claimed, requires that a court be guided by objective criteria, 
including: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and 
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”77 And “[b]y addressing at best only the first of these criteria, 
the Court has ignored most of the guidance this Court has developed for 
evaluating the proportionality of punishment.”78 The dissent analyzed all 
three factors and concluded that the Tisons and Enmund were “similarly 
situated . . . in every respect that mattered to the decision in Enmund.”79  
Just one year later, Justice Stevens penned the plurality opinion in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma,80 which all but abandoned the same factors in 
deciding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the 
execution of persons under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense. 
While the opinion did include an objective analysis, looking to state 
statutes, international law, and the behavior of juries,81 it adopted a new 
subjective inquiry. Justice Stevens relied on a modified form of 
comparative gravity, and dropped the comparative intrajurisdictional 
analysis in favor of the Gregg inquiry into the penological justifications 
 
 
 75. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 179. 
 77. Id. at 179–80 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)). 
 78. Id. at 180. 
 79. Id. at 182. 
 80. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 81. Id. at 823–33. 
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for the punishment.82 He thereby ignored over a decade of Eighth 
Amendment development that he, himself, had shaped.  
His analysis was reminiscent of the analysis in Enmund, which raised 
the proportion between the punishment and the culpability of the class of 
offenders, but with a new twist. In Enmund, the culpability informed the 
gravity of the offense of accomplice liability without intent to kill, and the 
proportion was thus between punishment and act. The Thompson analysis 
focused on the proportionality of the punishment-to-culpability of the class 
of offenders, irrespective of the act or crime they had committed.  
The comparative gravity analysis in Thompson, therefore, compared 
the generalized culpability of those within the group—defendants under 
sixteen years of age—to the culpability of those outside the group—
defendants over sixteen.83 And Justice Stevens concluded that the 
comparative culpability of those within the group was less than those 
outside.84 But Justice Stevens did not compare the punishment-to-
culpability proportion for those under sixteen to the proportion for similar 
groups within the same jurisdictions. For example, the opinion did not 
engage in a comparison between those under sixteen years of 
chronological age with those who have the emotional, mental, and 
cognitive capacity of that same group but a different chronological age 
(e.g., mentally retarded people). The opinion instead relied upon the 
penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and 
deterrence—and found them lacking when measured against the 
culpability of juveniles.85  
Had Justice Stevens commanded a majority, Thompson would have 
eclipsed Atkins as the first case recognizing punishment-to-culpability as 
disproportionate. The rationale ultimately failed to command a majority 
vote; Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment only, deciding the case 
 
 
 82. Id. at 836–38 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
 83. Id. at 833 (asking “whether the juvenile’s culpability should be measured by the same 
standard as that of the adult”). 
 84.   
“But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. . . .” [T]he Court has 
already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a 
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is 
too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less 
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct 
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer 
pressure than is an adult. 
Id. at 834–35. 
 85. Id. at 836–38. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] CRUEL AND UNEQUAL PUNISHMENTS 875 
 
 
 
 
on much narrower grounds.86 Yet Stevens’s approach would prove to have 
lasting effects. 
The next year, Justice Scalia employed Stevens’s Thompson 
reformulation in his majority opinion addressing the constitutionality of 
applying the death penalty to those under eighteen years of age. 
Emphasizing the language from earlier cases, Justice Scalia cautioned that 
the Eighth Amendment “should be informed by objective factors to the 
maximum possible extent.”87 First among those objective indicia, he 
found, are statutes passed by state legislatures.88 And the objective indicia 
in this case led the Court to conclude that no settled societal consensus 
existed against executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.89 In 
the absence of such objective evidence of unusualness, Justice Scalia 
found, the punishment could not be found to be both cruel and unusual, as 
required by the Eighth Amendment.90 
 
 
 86. Id. at 849, 857–58 (holding that in the peculiar circumstances of a legislature failing to set a 
minimum age for execution either without realizing its ultimate effect or without giving the question 
serious thought, the State could not execute people under the age of sixteen under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 87. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
592 (1977)).  
 88. Id. at 370.  
 89. Id. at 370–73. 
 90. Id. at 378. Justice Scalia’s appropriation of the Thompson reformulation to defeat a similar 
claim signaled the growing divide on the Court in Eight Amendment proportionality cases. By 1991, it 
became clear that a successful proportionality claim outside the capital sentencing context would be 
rare. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), a divided Court rejected the defendant’s claim 
that his sentence of life imprisonment without parole was disproportionate to the crime of possession 
of more than 650 grams of cocaine. The Court, however, could not agree on why his proportionality 
argument failed. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003). In Harmelin, Justice Scalia wrote 
that proportionality was an aspect of death penalty jurisprudence, and not general sentences. See 
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985–96. But he could only command a majority for the part of his opinion that 
articulated the Court’s individualized sentencing doctrine did not apply outside of the capital context. 
Id. at 995–96.  
 Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, distilled four 
common principles from the Court’s proportionality cases, implicitly rejecting the 
Gregg/Coker/Thompson approaches outside of capital sentencing. Id. at 998–1000 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). After examining these four factors, the concurrence rejected Harmelin’s claim. Id. at 
1009. 
 Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens in dissent, admonished both approaches. 
The dissent criticized Justice Scalia for seeking “to deliver a swift death sentence to Solem,” and 
Justice Kennedy for “eviscerat[ing] it, leaving only an empty shell.” Id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting). 
Instead, “the use of an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparison of punishments and crimes 
has long been an integral part of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 1019. And, by 
abandoning the second and third factors of the Solem test, Justice Kennedy made “any attempt at an 
objective proportionality analysis futile.” Id. at 1020. Any court to attempt such an assessment “would 
have no basis for its determination that a sentence was—or was not—disproportionate, other than the 
‘subjective views of individuals [judges],’ which is the very sort of analysis our Eighth Amendment 
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This past term, the Court quelled any speculation about whether its 
abbreviated analysis would reach beyond its punishment-to-culpability 
cases. In its most recent punishment-to-crime case, Kennedy v. 
Louisiana,91 the Court extended the Thompson (and Atkins) approach to 
find unconstitutional the death penalty for child rape, based on an 
objective interjurisdictional analysis,92 followed by a subjective analysis 
focusing on the penological justifications for the proportion.93 No vestige 
of its once robust intrajurisdictional analysis could be found. And in its 
statement denying rehearing, the Court ventured even further, laying the 
groundwork for future equal protection challenges.94 
II. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA 
A. The Court’s Opinion 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,95 prohibits the execution of the 
mentally retarded. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion for the 
Court.96 He began by reviewing the prior Eighth Amendment 
proportionality jurisprudence, and determined that the Thompson 
reformulation was controlling.97  
The analysis began with a review of societal perception of mental 
retardation, the objective prong of the analysis. Eighteen states had 
adopted legislation specifically exempting the mentally retarded from 
execution.98 Legislative enactments, together with public opinion polls and 
other survey data, enabled the majority to conclude that a national 
consensus had developed against executing the mentally retarded.99 The 
 
 
jurisprudence has shunned.” Id. at 1020 (internal citations omitted). The dissent then applied the three 
factors and found that the defendant’s punishment was disproportionate to his crime. Id. at 1021–27. 
 91. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 92. Id. at 2650–58. 
 93. Id. at 2658–64. 
 94. See infra Part IV; On Petition for Rehearing at 3–4, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 
(2008) (No. 07-343), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07relatingtoorders.html. 
(“This case, too, involves the application of the Eighth Amendment to civilian law; and so we need not 
decide whether certain considerations might justify differences in the application of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause to military cases . . . .”). 
 95. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 96. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 97. Id. at 311–13. 
 98. Id. at 314–16. 
 99. See id. at 316 n.21. 
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Court posited that this national consensus reflected a belief that the 
behavioral characteristics of the mentally retarded diminished their mental 
and moral culpability, and thereby made the ultimate punishment of death 
disproportionate, irrespective of the crime committed. It stated: 
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between 
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their 
impairments, however, by definition they have diminished 
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, 
to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in 
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the 
reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to 
engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant 
evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a 
premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers 
rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption 
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal 
culpability.100 
Turning to the subjective, the second prong of the Thompson 
reformulation, the Court brought its “independent judgment to bear” to 
determine whether the objective evidence comported with the Court’s 
intuitions about the cruelty of executing the mentally retarded.101 But the 
Court invoked a weaker form of comparative gravity analysis than in the 
past, and codified the Thompson to eliminate intrajurisdictional 
comparison.  
First, it stated that the mentally retarded have diminished personal 
culpability, but did not specify diminished as compared to whom.102 The 
intended comparison may have been to all others who could be subject to 
capital punishment, but Part III of this Article reveals the unlikelihood that 
the Court engaged in such explicit comparisons. Next, despite the strong 
admonitions in earlier cases, Stevens abandoned intrajurisdictional 
analysis altogether. He made no attempt to compare the punishment-to-
culpability proportion of the mentally retarded in Virginia to other 
similarly situated criminal defendants in Virginia.103 The exercise would 
 
 
 100. Id. at 318. 
 101. Id. at 313, 318–21. 
 102. Id. at 317–18 (“Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but 
they do diminish their personal culpability.”). 
 103. For example, persons who have the mental age of a minor, as argued in Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
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no doubt have been a difficult one, since the Court did not explain what 
constituted mental retardation.  
Despite its refusal to define the class, the Court did make a subjective 
determination on whether executing the mentally retarded would advance 
the punitive goals of the death penalty—retribution and deterrence.104 If 
not, it explained, executing the mentally retarded constituted a purposeless 
imposition of pain and suffering.105 To address this inquiry, the majority 
largely relied upon cognitive and behavioral impairments of its conception 
of the mentally retarded—such as the capacity to act rationally and to take 
moral consequences into account—and found that diminished capacity 
affects individual culpability for purposes of punishment by death.106 
The majority analogized that because retribution requires 
proportionality, the diminished culpability of the mentally retarded could 
not rise to the level sufficient for execution.107 Even if the mentally 
retarded could understand the wrongfulness of their conduct, because they 
lack the capacity to appreciate the consequences of their actions, or the 
ability to act on this knowledge, execution would be a disproportionate 
punishment under the goal of retribution.108 
The Court finally addressed whether executing the mentally retarded 
would advance the goal of deterrence.109 It found that the diminished 
capacity of the mentally retarded to calculate and to premeditate their 
actions undermines any deterrent effect of the death penalty upon them.110 
Moreover, diminished cognitive capacity renders the mentally retarded 
less able to assist in their defense, and impacts their demeanor such that 
jurors could be misled to impose a harsher sentence than deserved.111 The 
mentally retarded are also more likely to waive their rights without 
understanding the concept of “rights,” or the implications of voluntarily 
giving up those rights.112 This ignorance is compounded by a susceptibility 
to an atmosphere of threats or coercion, where a desire to please and 
escape the situation makes an abuse of rights and false confessions even 
more likely.113 These factors, in combination, made the Court unable to 
 
 
 104. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20. 
 105. Id. at 319. 
 106. Id. at 319–20. 
 107. Id. at 319 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 
433 (1980)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 319–20. 
 110. Id. at 320. 
 111. Id. at 320–21. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
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distill a constitutional rationale for executing the mentally retarded.114 And 
so, commanding a majority for the first time, a category of people could 
not be sentenced to death without questioning how other similar groups 
were being punished. 
B. Defining Mental Retardation 
While the Court offered powerful rationale for protecting the mentally 
retarded, it declined to provide a substantive definition of the class. 
Instead, the Court demurred: “[a]s was our approach in Ford v. 
Wainwright, with regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of 
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon 
[their] execution of sentences.’”115 
For the Court to find that the right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishments applies differently to the mentally retarded, and then leave to 
the states the task of defining that group, may be alarming. And yet the 
Court’s decision to avoid defining the class in Atkins should come as no 
surprise: the Court took exactly the same approach in Ford v. Wainwright 
when it constitutionalized the common-law practice of exempting the 
insane from the imposition of the death penalty, imposing procedural 
safeguards without venturing a substantive definition of insanity in its 
opinion.116 In Ford, Justice Powell highlighted the conflict in recognizing 
a new substantive constitutional right while failing to define it in his 
concurring opinion.117 As such, he ventured a substantive definition of 
insanity.118 Lacking any other guidance by the majority, nearly every state 
legislature or state court since Ford either maintained or adopted an 
interpretation of insanity for the purpose of execution similar to that 
offered by Justice Powell.119 
The response by state legislature and courts to Ford should have 
guided the Court against taking the same course.120 Indeed, the Court’s 
 
 
 114. Id. at 319–21.  
 115. Id. at 317 (citations omitted). 
 116. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 117. Id. at 418–19 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the majority opinion did not address the 
constitutional meaning of insanity in the context of criminal executions, and turning to common-law 
principles and the modern practices of state legislatures to provide that meaning).  
 118. Id. at 422 (“Accordingly, I would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only 
of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”). 
 119. See statutes cited infra note 120. 
 120. Responses to the Ford opinion on the state level have varied widely. In the wake of that 
opinion, four states maintained a general prohibition on executing the insane, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-101 (2001); one state maintained a standard substantially similar to Justice Powell’s, see 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 2001); and eight states maintained a standard that was substantially 
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2007 decision in Panetti v. Quartermain121 simply underscores that failing 
to provide a substantive definition for the class in the first instance 
ultimately requires that the Court later address the disparity. In Panetti, the 
Court partially came to terms with the Ford Court’s failure and “cobble[d] 
together”122 a new definition of insanity, as it should have done years 
before. Moreover, by imposing procedural safeguards for the mentally 
retarded without a corresponding substantive definition, the Court creates 
a perverse incentive for states to define the class too narrowly.123 In 
response to new Supreme Court rulings, state legislatures and courts 
largely seek to avoid being overturned on appeal.124 This objective is most 
easily achieved by creating substantive standards that are easily met and 
align well with the Court’s earlier ruling. 
Nonetheless, the Court in Atkins left to the states the ultimate burden of 
defining the mentally retarded entitled to this unique Eighth Amendment 
protection.125 The Court delegated this responsibility, even though the 
legal concept of mental retardation is not self-defining. But it did drop 
clues about the contours of the class in its analysis: 
(1) Characteristics of the Mentally Retarded: The Court noted that  
clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only 
subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations 
in . . . self care, . . . self direction[,] . . . diminished capacities to 
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract 
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of 
others. . . . [T]here is abundant evidence that they often act on 
 
 
similar to Justice Powell’s, but that also included a competency provision, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 15A-1001 (2007). In addition, one state adopted a general prohibition on executing the insane, see 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:24 (2003); fifteen states adopted Justice Powell’s standard, see, e.g., GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-10-60 (2004); and four states adopted a standard that was substantially similar to 
Justice Powell’s, but that also included a competency provision, see, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-
10A-1 (2004). Four states have not formally provided either a statutory or common law prohibition on 
executing the insane. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2-3)(a) (1992) (prohibiting execution of 
defendant unable to understand nature and purpose of his sentence) (repealed Jan. 1, 1994). Thirteen 
states currently prohibit the death penalty altogether. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill 
Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3. 
 121. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
 122. Id. at 2874 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 123. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1162 
(2008). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in 
group settings they are followers rather than leaders.126 
(2) Constitutional Limitation: “Not all people who claim to be 
mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of 
mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national 
consensus.”127 Suggesting that there may be a constitutional 
limitation on those who can claim mental retardation, irrespective of 
the definition adopted. 
(3) Safe Harbor: The Court essentially created a safe harbor for 
states to adopt medical diagnostic criteria for mental retardation. 
Despite historical rejection of medical criteria to identify classes of 
individuals to whom criminal responsibility or punishment should 
attach,128 the Court specifically referenced clinical definitions of 
mental retardation with seeming approval and noted that, although 
the eighteen states with then-current legislation were not uniform, 
the majority of state statutes used the American Association of 
Mental Retardation (AAMR) or American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) clinical definitions of mental retardation.129  
Unsurprisingly, these three factors, and particularly the third, have 
guided state legislatures and courts seeking to comply with Atkins.  
C. Legislative Response 
Since Atkins v. Virginia,130 eight states have changed their laws to 
comply with the decision. Every single one relied upon medical diagnostic 
criteria to define mental retardation.131 Eighteen other states and the 
 
 
 126. Id. at 318 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 127. Id. at 317. 
 128. For examples of the Court rejecting the use of medical criteria to formulate a single definition 
of legal insanity, see Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2722 (2006) (“[M]edical definitions devised to 
justify treatment, like legal ones devised to excuse from conventional criminal responsibility, are 
subject to flux and disagreement. There being such fodder for reasonable debate about what the 
cognate legal and medical tests should be, due process imposes no single canonical formulation of 
legal insanity.”) (citations omitted), and Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952) (“[C]hoice of a 
test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the extent 
to which that knowledge should determine criminal responsibility.”). 
 129. “The statutory definitions of mental retardation are not identical, but generally conform to the 
clinical definitions set forth in n. 3, supra.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22. 
 130. 536 U.S. 304. 
 131. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West Supp. 2007) (requiring “significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested 
before the age of 18”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3)(d) (2007) (defining serious mental 
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federal government preserved their statutory approach of using medical 
diagnostic criteria in light of Atkins.132 The APA criteria in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), and the American 
Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities133 (AAIDD) 
diagnostic criteria serve the basis for most statutory schemes. 
The AAIDD defined mental retardation, at the time of the Atkins 
opinion, as follows: 
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present 
functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related 
limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill 
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, 
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional 
academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before 
age 18.134 
 
 
retardation as “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning that exists concurrently with 
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and both the significantly subaverage intellectual functioning 
and the deficits in adaptive behavior were manifested before the individual became 18 years of age”); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(a) (2004) (defining mentally retarded as “significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning” accompanied with limitations in adaptive functioning, and requiring 
onset before the age of 18); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15(d) (2006) (requiring age of onset by 18, 
and allowing an IQ score of 75 or below to serve as presumptive evidence of mental retardation, when 
accompanied by significant deficits in adaptive behavior); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
905.5.1(H) (2008) (using medical diagnostic criteria, including age of onset before 18, while excluding 
other similar conditions from definition of mental retardation); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098 
(West Supp. 2008) (adopting clinical definition requiring “significant subaverage general intellectual 
functioning which exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the 
developmental period”); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a-101 to -102 (2003) (allowing age of onset 
before 22, but otherwise comporting with traditional medical diagnostic criteria); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1 (A) (2008) (using medical diagnostic criteria including age of onset before 18). 
 132. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2006); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 1-1(g) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(i) 
(2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2007); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130-140 (West 2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b) (LexisNexis 
2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (Supp. 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (Supp. 2006); N.M. 
STAT. § 31-20A-2.1 (Supp. 2008); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-13-203 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (2002). In 1994, Congress also adopted 
legislation to ban the execution of mentally retarded individuals before Atkins; however, the statute 
does not define mental retardation or discuss at what stage in the criminal proceedings the 
determination of mental retardation must be made. See 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2000). 
 133. In 2006, the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) changed its name to the 
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). See Press Release, 
Am. Ass’n on Mental Retardation, World’s Oldest Organization on Intellectual Disability Has a 
Progressive New Name (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.aaidd.org/news/news_item.cfm?OID=1314. 
 134. AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (Ruth Luckasson et al. eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
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The APA’s definition in the DSM-IV was in accord: 
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is 
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at 
least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, 
home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community 
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, 
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 
years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different 
etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various 
pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central 
nervous system. . . . Mild mental retardation is [typically used to 
describe people with an] IQ level of 50–55 to approximately 70.135 
Both the AAIDD and APA definitions have three basic components: 
(1) limited intellectual functioning, (2) deficits in adaptive functioning, 
and (3) an age of onset before the age of eighteen.  
1. Limited Intellectual Functioning 
Intelligent quotient (IQ) tests are the most frequently used diagnostic 
tool for assessing human intellectual functioning. The AAIDD defines 
intelligence as general mental capability involving the ability to reason, 
plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn 
quickly, and learn from experience.136 The IQ score offers a standardized 
measure of these factors. Based on the population distribution of these 
scores, those with an IQ score of approximately seventy or below, and 
deficits in other areas, satisfy the clinical definition of mental retardation. 
Taking standard error into account, two standard deviations below the 
mean would allow for a score up to a seventy-five. Only two percent of the 
American population score in this range on an IQ test.137 
 
 
 135. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
39–40 (4th ed. 1994). 
 136. See American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Frequently Asked 
Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD Definition, http://www.aaidd.org/content_185.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
 137. Joseph A. Nese, Jr., The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination of the 
Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 375 (2002). 
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2. Deficits in Adaptive Behavior 
AAIDD defines adaptive behavior as a collection of learned 
conceptual, social, and practical skills that enable one to function in 
everyday life.138 Adaptive functioning impairments may be measured by 
standardized tests or through a detailed historical life account. School 
records, job history, and other measures of basic self-care go into an 
assessment of adaptive functioning.139 
3. Age of Onset 
Both the AAIDD and APA diagnostic criteria for mental retardation 
require an age of onset before eighteen years of life. In medicine, age of 
onset helps a clinician to distinguish mental retardation from other mental 
disabilities.140 As such, mental health practitioners look at school records 
and childhood medical records to determine if the patient has mental 
retardation, with an early life onset, or another condition with similar 
behavioral manifestations suggesting a different treatment protocol.141  
III. MENTAL RETARDATION IN MEDICINE AND LAW 
Law and medicine use words in different ways. Legal rules define 
standards of conduct and the consequences for breaking those rules. 
Medical diagnostic criteria define the characteristics of a condition, which 
may guide future treatment protocols. Blindly importing medical 
 
 
 138. AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 134. 
 139. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative 
Issues 7–8 (2002), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/MREllisLeg.pdf. 
 140. Id. at 9–10. 
 141. The best argument advocates of the age of onset criterion can muster is that without a clear 
boundary requiring onset before eighteen, defendants will be able to fake mental retardation and 
escape the ultimate sentence for their crimes. Cf. Michael Welner, Lose Brain, Save Life (July 23, 
2001), http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/Articles/LoseBrain.htm. The argument is that to feign mental 
retardation would be difficult where school records and health records from early childhood are 
required. Most states therefore rely on onset before the age of eighteen to counter concerns about 
malingering. See Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: 
Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death 
Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 916 (2001). While malingering is a danger whenever psychiatric 
diagnoses are at issue, one could employ psychological tests for malingering rather than narrowly 
circumscribing the constitutional protection afforded. Moreover, as Part IV, infra, of the Article 
demonstrates, the Court has now recognized that the mentally retarded have a fundamental right to not 
be executed under the Eighth Amendment. It is unlikely that a fear of feigning a medical condition 
would suffice as a compelling state interest to require only those medical conditions with an age of 
onset before eighteen be included within the legal definition of mental retardation. 
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diagnostic criteria into law may therefore have unintended and undesired 
results. Mental disease or defect, for example, has a legal meaning in the 
context of the insanity defense. This is true even though the phrase sounds 
in both medicine and in law. The Court in Atkins, however, ignored the 
traditional divide between medical diagnoses and legal rules, and failed to 
craft legal criteria for mental retardation. That failure paved the way for 
present and future unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals 
under the Eighth Amendment and blinded the Court to the potential equal 
protection implications of its ruling. 
As discussed in Part II.B, the Court established a safe harbor for states 
to adopt medical diagnostic criteria for mental retardation. Now, because 
of the legislative schemes adopted by states, only those individuals who 
satisfy the medical diagnostic criteria for mental retardation outlined in 
Part II.C, can exercise a claim of mental retardation and exemption from 
the death penalty, as recognized in Atkins.  
As this Part seeks to demonstrate, the medical term mental retardation, 
however, is simply a linguistic quirk rather than the meaningful basis for a 
legal classification. An adult with intellectual and adaptive functioning 
loss due to illness, accident, infection, or disease does not suffer 
retardation in his development. His cognitive, behavioral, and adaptive 
functioning diminishes or regresses, rather than being retarded. So the 
linguistic label for those individuals has been distinguished from mental 
retardation based on language, diagnosis, and treatment, rather than legal 
criteria about their relative culpability. Likewise, the adult with traumatic 
brain injury has arrested or diminished development after his injury. To 
base a legal classification of individuals entitled to exercise the right to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishments upon a linguistic quirk seems the 
epitome of arbitrary and unequal treatment. 
With remarkable insight to this very problem, the American 
Psychological Association, the publishers of the DSM-IV Text Revision 
(DSM-IV-TR), cautioned against such wholesale importation of 
psychological or medical diagnostic criteria into law. They note: 
When the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are 
employed for forensic purposes, there are significant risks that 
diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood. These 
dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of 
ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a 
clinical diagnosis. In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a 
DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence 
for legal purposes of a “mental disorder,” “mental disability,” 
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“mental disease,” or “mental defect.” In determining whether an 
individual meets a specified legal standard (e.g., for competence, 
criminal responsibility, or disability), additional information is 
usually required beyond that contained in the DSM-IV diagnosis.142 
The DSM-IV-TR, like the revisions that preceded it, also includes a 
“Cautionary Statement,” explaining that: 
The purpose of DSM-IV is to provide clear descriptions of 
diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians and investigators 
to diagnose, communicate about, . . . and treat people with various 
mental disorders. It is to be understood that inclusion here, for 
clinical and research purposes, of a diagnostic category . . . does not 
imply that the condition meets legal or other nonmedical criteria for 
what constitutes mental disease, mental disorder, or mental 
disability. The clinical and scientific considerations involved in 
categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may not be 
wholly relevant to legal judgments, for example, that take into 
account such issues as individual responsibility, disability 
determination, and competency.143 
The medical and psychiatric communities recognize what the state 
legislatures do not: the illogic of grafting medical diagnostic criteria onto 
legal tests for responsibility or culpability. As the discussion that follows 
makes evident, a medical definition of mental retardation simply invites 
unequal imposition of the death penalty. 
A number of medical conditions give rise to the same cognitive, 
behavioral, and adaptive limitations the Court highlighted in Atkins. The 
Court identified deficits in the mentally retarded—the ability to engage in 
logical reasoning and to understand and process information (cognition), 
to communicate with others (communication), to direct one’s own actions 
and to control one’s own impulses (mental health and behavior), to 
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience (judgment), and to care 
for oneself (adaptation)—that undermine the deterrent and retributive 
rationale for the death penalty. Table 1 summarizes other medical 
conditions that present the same deficits. The discussion that follows 
includes a more detailed scientific account of each condition and the 
legislative and judicial response in capital cases to each condition. 
 
 
 142. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
xxxii–iii (4th ed., text rev. 2000).  
 143. Id. at xxxvii.  
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Medicine differentiates these conditions based on etiology to identify 
appropriate treatment alternatives. These etiological distinctions have 
become the basis for inequitable treatment under states’ application of this 
categorical exemption. 
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF DEFICITS BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT 
DESCRIPTION OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND SIMILAR CONDITIONS 
  Potential Deficits 
 
  Cognition Communication Mental Health & Behavior Judgment Adaptive skills
 
Mental 
Retardation 
(per Atkins) 
Logical 
reasoning, 
understanding & 
processing 
information 
Communication 
with others 
Direct actions and 
self-control, 
impulsive 
Abstract from 
mistakes, learn 
from experience
Care for oneself
TBI 
Logical 
reasoning, 
thinking, general 
cognition 
Communication 
with others, 
expression and 
understanding 
Direct or modify 
actions, self-
control, social 
appropriateness 
Learn from 
experience, 
judgment 
Care for 
oneself, social 
functioning 
Fr
on
ta
l L
ob
e 
D
ys
fu
nc
tio
n 
Dementia 
Learning, 
remembering, 
executive 
functioning, 
abstract thought, 
planning 
Communication 
with others, 
comprehending 
written and 
spoken language, 
speech content 
Self-control, 
socialization, 
conforming to 
social 
conventions of 
conduct 
Perceive social 
cues, adopt 
social 
conventions 
Care for 
oneself, social 
functioning, 
occupational 
functioning 
Pe
rv
as
iv
e 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
ta
l 
D
iso
rd
er
s 
Autism 
 
Intellectual 
abilities, 
executive 
functioning 
 
Communication 
with others, 
development of 
language, speech 
content 
 
Direct or modify 
actions, self-
control, impulse 
control, avoiding 
self-injurious 
behavior 
Abstract from 
mistakes, learn 
from 
experience, 
perceive social 
cues 
Routines or 
habits, social 
functioning 
 
Epilepsy 
Learning, 
intellectual 
abilities, 
executive 
functioning, 
planning 
Communication 
with others, 
language, 
naming, discourse 
production 
Impulse control, 
mental flexibility
Recognition of 
emotion in 
others, 
perception of 
fear 
Daily living, 
social 
functioning 
C
en
tr
al
 N
er
vo
us
 S
ys
te
m
 
D
ys
fu
nc
tio
n 
 
Bacterial 
Meningitis 
Learning, verbal 
ability, motor 
skills, executive 
functioning 
Communication 
with others, 
speech and 
language 
Direct and control 
actions 
Perception, 
judgment 
Social 
functioning 
 
A. Frontal Lobe Dysfunction 
Damage to the frontal lobes of the brain can profoundly impact 
behavior. The frontal lobes of the brain have primary control over 
programming, regulation, and verification of mental activity, and “control 
many of the qualities that distinguish humans from lower primates.”144 The 
 
 
 144. Terri A. Edwards-Lee & Ronald E. Saul, Neuropsychiatry of the Right Frontal Lobe, in THE 
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frontal lobes affect emotion, will, judgment, foresight, creativity, and 
abstract reasoning.145 Behaviorally, the frontal lobes are critical to one’s 
performance of executive functions, including maintenance of problem 
solving sets for future goals, organization of behavior, flexibility in 
problem solving, self-monitoring and self-regulation, conformity to rules 
of social behavior, and the utilization of reward and punishment to 
facilitate learning.146 Consequently, studies have consistently linked 
frontal lobe damage to increased violence, aggression, and criminal 
behavior.147 
The right frontal lobe, for example, guides interpretation of emotional 
stimuli and expression of emotional responses.148 Individuals with right 
frontal lobe damage may have difficulty interpreting emotional 
information, choosing appropriate words to describe emotional situations, 
and expressing accurate facial expressions in response to emotional 
stimuli.149 In addition, right frontal lobe damage can cause deficits in 
adhering to social rules and in behaving appropriately in social 
situations.150  
While the etiology of frontal lobe dysfunction varies,151 traumatic brain 
injury and dementia warrant a more detailed inquiry. 
 
 
HUMAN FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS 304, 304 (Bruce L. Miller & Jeffrey L. 
Cummings eds., 1st ed. 1999) (citation omitted).  
 145. Id. 
 146. Bonnie Brookshire et al., Components of Executive Function in Typically Developing and 
Head-Injured Children, 25 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 61, 62 (2004). 
 147. See, e.g., Rodger L. Wood & Christina Liossi, Neuropsychological and Neurobehavioral 
Correlates of Aggression Following Traumatic Brain Injury, 18 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL 
NEUROSCIENCES 333 (2006). 
 148. Edwards-Lee & Saul, supra note 144, at 311. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 313. 
 151. Two other frontal lobe conditions, frontal lobe tumors and fronto-temporal lobar 
degeneration (FTLD), share significant overlap with medically diagnosed mental retardation.  
1. Frontal lobe tumors can result in both psychiatric and behavioral deficiencies, although 
behavioral limitations vary based on the location of the tumor in the brain. Tomoko Y. 
Nakawatase, Frontal Lobe Tumors, in THE HUMAN FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND 
DISORDERS, supra note 144, at 436, 440–41. Frontal lobe tumors often present themselves as 
mood disorders in a psychiatric evaluation, and induce hallucinations, delusions, catatonia, 
mania, schizophreniform psychosis, and depression. Id. at 440. Orbitofrontal tumors, for 
example, tend to cause an individual to act disinterested in a socially inappropriate way and 
cause “irritability, profanity, and jocularity.” Id. at 441. Tumors in the left hemisphere can 
cause decreased verbosity, decreased fluency, and circumlocutory speech with frequent word-
finding pauses. Id. Individuals with tumors in the “dorsolateral convexity . . . demonstrate 
apathy, reduced drive, depressed mentation, and poor planning.” Id. 
2. FTLD is a “neurodegenerative disease that selectively attacks the frontal and anterior 
temporal regions” of the brain. Pei-Ning Wang & Bruce L. Miller, Clinical Aspects of 
Frontotemporal Dementia, in THE HUMAN FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS 
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1. Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) 
Traumatic brain injury can produce the same behavioral limitations as 
medically diagnosed mental retardation. TBI aptly illustrates the problem 
with using medical diagnostic criteria for mental retardation as the sole 
legal definition of mental retardation for purposes of heightened Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny. 
TBI may occur at any point during an individual’s life, including well 
after the eighteen-year cutoff for medically diagnosed mental retardation. 
Approximately one million children sustain a TBI each year.152 But 
children and adolescents age nineteen years and younger account for only 
28% of severe head injuries.153 Thus over 70% of TBI injuries, or over 
700,000 annual TBI injuries, occur after the age of onset for medically 
diagnosed mental retardation.154 Although the extent of disability arising 
from a TBI depends upon several factors, including the severity of the 
injury, its location, and the age and general health of the individual,155 
common deficits arise in: 
 
 
365, 365 (Bruce L. Miller & Jeffrey L. Cummings eds., 2d ed. 2007). Although the typical 
age of onset is between fifty and sixty years, it can occur as early as the twenties. Id. 
Incidence of FTLD varies with age, ranging from 8.9 per 100,000 in the sixty to sixty-nine 
age group, to 2.2 per 100,000 in the forty to forty-nine age group. Id. Individuals with FTLD 
exhibit personality changes reflecting a loss of impulse control that include disinhibition, loss 
of respect for personal boundaries, overfriendliness with strangers, and verbal outbursts. Id. at 
368. Because individuals with FTLD have poor impulse control, they are at a high risk of 
antisocial and criminal behavior. Id. at 369. These individuals also exhibit a loss of concern 
for others, become self-centered, and are unable to comprehend the emotions of others. Id. 
Individuals with FTLD also suffer from impaired communication, not only because of their 
impulsivity, but also because many develop language barriers ranging from hesitant, broken 
speech to mutism. Id. at 369–70. Individuals with FTLD also lose executive functioning, 
which results in the severe impairment of “multitasking, . . . abstracting, making sound 
judgments, planning, and problem solving.” Id. Some develop aggressive and psychotic 
features with bizarre and grandiose hallucinations. Id. at 369.  
 Individuals with FTLD, like the medically diagnosed mentally retarded, have diminished 
capacities to communicate, engage in logical reasoning, control impulses, understand the reactions of 
others, and act according to a plan. They are unable to function in everyday life on their own due to 
loss of empathy, apathy, diminished insight, and inappropriate social behaviors. Id. Yet legislative 
enactments exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty exclude even those individuals 
most severely impacted by FTLD. 
 152. Elsa Arroyos-Jurado et al., Traumatic Brain Injury in School-Age Children Academic and 
Social Outcome, 38 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 571, 571 (2000). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Traumatic Brain Injury: Hope Through 
Research, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tbi/detail_tbi.htm#106683218 (last visited Mar. 9, 
2008). 
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(1) Cognition, including thinking, memory retention, and reasoning 
ability. Individuals with TBI suffer lasting impairments in working 
memory, motor skills, language, and general cognition.156 TBI 
deficits often negatively impact academic and social performance, 
and can persist throughout life.157 This is evident in the “persistent 
decline[] in Full Scale and Performance IQ” that often follows 
TBI;158 
(2) Sensory Processing, including sight, hearing, touch, taste, and 
smell;159 
(3) Communication, including expression and understanding;160 
(4) Behavior and Mental Health, including depression, anxiety, 
personality changes, aggression, acting out, inability to modify 
actions based on information, social inappropriateness,161 
deficiencies in “self-esteem, self-control, [and] awareness of self 
and others;”162 
(5) Judgment, even in cases where IQ is unaffected, may be 
devastated;163 and, 
(6) Adaptive Functioning, in that TBI can create deficiencies in 
executive and adaptive functioning even if intellectual and language 
functions are unimpaired,164 including unawareness of social rules, 
disinterest in social involvement, sexuality, appearance and 
grooming, or family relationships, and age-inappropriate 
behavior.165 
The natural fit between TBI and medically diagnosed mental 
retardation has led capital defendants with TBI to invoke Atkins, 
unsuccessfully, as a bar to their execution. Rather than challenge the 
legislative classification of mental retardation on equal protection grounds, 
these defendants claim their condition is analogous to mental retardation. 
 
 
 156. Arroyos-Jurado, supra note 152, at 572.  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 573–74.  
 159. Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, supra note 155. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Arroyos-Jurado, supra note 152, at 574–75. 
 162. Id. at 574. 
 163. Jonathan H. Pincus, Aggression, Criminality, and the Frontal Lobes, in THE HUMAN 
FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS, supra note 144, at 547, 553. 
 164. Brookshire et al., supra note 146, at 63. 
 165. Arroyos-Jurado, supra note 152, at 574. 
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Put otherwise, these defendants claim that the rationale of Atkins supports 
a categorical exemption for their condition as well.  
Every court faced with such a claim has rejected it.166 The Louisiana 
state legislature has even gone so far as to note specifically that 
individuals with “organic brain damage occurring after age eighteen” and 
“traumatic brain damage occurring after age eighteen” do not necessarily 
have mental retardation.167 
 
 
 166. For example, the court in State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1238–40 (Ariz. 2003), recognized that 
the defendant presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that he suffered from organic 
brain damage, and that he had significant cognitive impairments as a result. Because he did not satisfy 
the specific “adaptive functioning” limitations required by the medical diagnostic criteria cited “with 
approval” in the Atkins opinion, however, Grell did not satisfy the required definition of mental 
retardation. Id. at 1238–41.  
 Another court opinion suggests a more permissive approach. On appeal from his capital 
conviction and sentence, the defendant in Hillhouse v. Warden of San Quentin State Prison filed an 
amended petition alleging that he had “a mental age of between two and twelve” and thus was 
mentally retarded and could not be executed under Atkins. No. CIV S-03-0142 MCE CMK P., 2007 
WL 1247103, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). Because he was seeking an amendment to his petition 
for habeas relief, his original claim had to relate back to his original petition in order for relief to be 
granted. The original petition did not allege mental retardation but did mention that the defendant had 
“temporal and frontal lobe brain damage, which impairs his ability to control his emotions.” Id. The 
court held that “the facts of brain damage and inability to control emotions are simply a different way 
of saying that petitioner is mentally challenged,” and allowed the amendment. Id. 
 167. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure sets the following limits on “mental retardation”: 
“‘Mental retardation’ means a disability characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual 
functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. The 
onset must occur before the age of eighteen years.” LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(1) 
(2008). This article further provides that  
[a] diagnosis of one or more of the following conditions does not necessarily constitute 
mental retardation: 
(a) Autism. 
(b) Behavioral disorders. 
(c) Cerebral palsy and other motor deficits. 
(d) Difficulty in adjusting to school. 
(e) Emotional disturbance. 
(f) Emotional stress in home or school. 
(g) Environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. 
(h) Epilepsy and other seizure disorders. 
(i) Lack of educational opportunities. 
(j) Learning disabilities. 
(k) Mental illness. 
(l) Neurological disorders. 
(m) Organic brain damage occurring after age eighteen. 
(n) Other handicapping conditions. 
(o) Personality disorders. 
(p) Sensory impairments. 
(q) Speech and language disorders. 
(r) A temporary crisis situation. 
(s) Traumatic brain damage occurring after age eighteen. 
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The court in Martinez Ramirez v. Schriro168 found brain damage to be 
insufficient to establish a legal claim of mental retardation.169 The 
defendant moved for leave to file a second amended petition, “alleg[ing] 
that his low IQ, brain damage, and other impairments render[ed] him 
ineligible for the death penalty,” based on the rationale in Atkins.170 The 
court disagreed,171 holding that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Atkins only 
applied to “those individuals determined to be mentally retarded under 
state law,”172 and noting that there was “no constitutional prohibition on 
the execution of persons with mental impairments that do not amount to 
incompetency or mental retardation.”173 In short, the court found that 
although the defendant had the same cognitive and behavioral limitations 
as medically diagnosed mental retardation, the etiology of his condition 
made Atkins inapplicable. 
In the one reported case in which a capital defendant challenged the 
legal definition of mental retardation based on his TBI, the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. The defendant in Hicks v. Schofield174 
applied for a certificate of probable cause to appeal his death sentence, 
alleging that he should be entitled to establish a legal claim of mental 
retardation because he “suffer[ed] from fetal alcohol syndrome, [was] 
microcephalic, meaning his brain [was] two standard deviations smaller 
than normal,” and sustained a TBI following a motorcycle accident.175 The 
majority denied his application without comment.176 The dissent, however, 
believed such evidence established a credible legal claim for mental 
retardation, and should have been allowed to proceed.177 Ignoring the 
opportunity to revisit their failure in Atkins, the United States Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.178  
 
 
Id. art. 905.5.1(H)(2). 
 168. No. CV 97-1331-PHX-JAT, 2007 WL 864415 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2007). 
 169. Id. at *7. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. The court found both that his claim did not relate back to his original claim, and was thus 
procedurally barred, and that even if it were not procedurally barred, it would nevertheless have failed 
on the merits. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. 
 174. 599 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 2004), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
 175. Id. at 156 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. (majority opinion). 
 177. Id. at 156–57 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting). 
 178. Hicks v. Schofield, 542 U.S. 953 (2004).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] CRUEL AND UNEQUAL PUNISHMENTS 893 
 
 
 
 
2. Dementia 
Dementia means the “loss of brain function.”179 It is not a single 
disease, but refers instead to a group of illnesses that involve cognition, 
behavior, and learning.180 A diagnosis of dementia requires “memory 
impairment and at least one of the following”: a disturbance in executive 
functioning, aphasia (loss of the ability to produce and/or comprehend 
language due to brain injury), or agnosia (loss of the ability to recognize 
objects, persons, sounds, shapes, or smells).181 “Dementia may be 
progressive, static, or remitting.”182  
Dementia affects nearly ten percent of individuals over the age of 
sixty-five, although it is sometimes present at younger ages as well.183 But 
it nearly always affects individuals after the age of onset of eighteen 
required for medically diagnosed mental retardation.184 
Dementia can have varying etiology. The DSM-IV includes specific 
diagnoses for Alzheimer’s-type dementia, vascular dementia, dementia 
due to HIV, dementia due to head trauma, dementia due to Parkinson’s 
disease, dementia due to Huntington’s disease, dementia due to Pick’s 
disease, and dementia due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.185 Moreover, brain 
tumors, subdural hematoma, hypothyroidism, hypoglycemia, infectious 
conditions, nutritional deficiencies, and multiple sclerosis can also cause 
dementia.186 While the etiology, age of onset, and severity of dementia 
guides the precise contours of the condition, common deficits include: 
(1) Cognition, in that most individuals with dementia have an 
impaired ability to learn new material, tend to forget things that they 
have previously learned,187 and often forget their own names.188 
 
 
 179. U.S. National Library of Medicine, Medline Plus, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/ 
article/000739.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2008). 
 180. Id. 
 181. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 135, at 134. 
 182. Id. at 137. 
 183. Christine Kennard, Is Dementia Age Related?, http://alzheimers.about.com/od/research/a/ 
age_dementia.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).  
 184. See Aaron McMurtray et al., Early-Onset Dementia: Frequency and Causes Compared to 
Late-Onset Dementia, 21 DEMENTIA & GERIATRIC COGNITIVE DISORDERS 59, 62 (2006). 
 185. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 135, at 139–50 (discussing symptoms of various 
types of dementia). 
 186. Id. at 151. 
 187. Id. at 134. 
 188. Id. 
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Disturbance in executive functioning is common, and includes 
impairments in the ability “to think abstractly and to plan;”189  
(2) Communication, including deficiencies in communication like 
compromised comprehension of spoken and written language, and 
vague and empty speech;190 
(3) Behavior and Mental Health, including behavioral dysfunction 
like uninhibited behavior, “making inappropriate jokes, neglecting 
personal hygiene, exhibiting undue familiarity with strangers, [and] 
disregarding conventional rules of social conduct;”191 and  
(4) Adaptive Functioning, including impairments in occupational 
and social functioning.192  
Courts rely primarily on the late onset of dementia as the basis for 
discriminating against these defendants. In Clayton v. Luebbers,193 for 
example, the capital defendant raised an Atkins claim for mental 
retardation, based on testimony that he suffered from “dementia, 
secondary to traumatic injury-at the time of the murder.”194 The court 
rejected his claim, holding that he had not presented evidence that any of 
his symptoms manifested before the age of eighteen—a necessary 
requirement under the statutory definition of mental retardation.195 The 
court found instead that the defendant was “relying on his brain injury to 
support this retardation claim,” which “did not occur until [the defendant] 
was an adult.”196 In addition, it found no support in the record that he ever 
functioned at the level of a mentally retarded person.197 
Other courts recognize the shared characteristics of dementia and 
medically diagnosed mental retardation, but nevertheless discriminate 
against those with dementia. In Moore v. Dretke,198 for example, the court 
 
 
 189. Id. at 135. 
 190. Id. at 134. 
 191. Id. at 136. 
 192. Id. at 134. 
 193. No. 02 MC 8001 CV W NKL, 2006 WL 1128803 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 194. Id. at *41. 
 195. Id. at *42–43. See also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030(6) (West 2008) (providing that “‘mental 
retardation’” “refer[s] to a condition involving substantial limitations in general functioning 
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning with continual extensive related 
deficits and limitations in two or more adaptive behaviors such as communication, self-care, home 
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and 
work, which conditions are manifested and documented before eighteen years of age”). 
 196. Clayton, 2006 WL 1128803, at *43. 
 197. Id. 
 198. No. Civ.A. 603CV224, 2005 WL 1606437 (E.D. Tex. July 1, 2005), vacated on reh’g on 
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reasoned that an individual whose subaverage intellectual functioning and 
related adaptive deficits manifested after the age of eighteen could “be 
diagnosed with dementia, but not with mental retardation.”199 And in a 
pre-Atkins case, where mental retardation was considered a mitigating 
factor to the death penalty, one judge noted in concurrence that the only 
apparent basis for distinguishing between dementia and mental retardation 
is age of onset: “[w]hile dementia shares characteristics with mental 
retardation, its onset may occur after age eighteen.”200  
B. Pervasive Developmental Disorders 
Pervasive developmental disorders can cause severe and persistent 
impairments in cognition, social interaction, and communication skills.201 
 
 
other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 199. Id. at *15. See also People v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 541 n.15 (Ct. App. 2005), 
rev’d on other grounds, 155 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2007) (“If a person falls into the mentally retarded range as 
a result of brain damage incurred after he or she reaches adulthood, the diagnosis is dementia, not 
mental retardation.”).  
 200. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Meyers, J., concurring). 
 201. Less severe, but also impactful, is the pervasive developmental disorder attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which is characterized by persistent inattention, hyperactivity-
impulsivity, and evidence of clinically significant impairment in “social, academic, or occupational 
functioning.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 135, at 78. ADHD may also be related to temper 
outbursts, demoralization, rejection by peers, and poor self-esteem. Id. at 80. Particularly when ADHD 
is accompanied by a comorbid condition, like psychosis, a learning disability, or a head injury, the 
cognitive deficit is more pronounced. David J. Bridgett & Michael E. Walker, Intellectual Functioning 
in Adults with ADHD: A Meta-Analytic Examination of Full Scale IQ Differences Between Adults With 
and Without ADHD, 18 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 1, 10 (2006).  
 Between three to seven percent of all children have now been diagnosed with ADHD. Child 
Trends Databank, ADHD, http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/76ADHD.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2009). While the severity of deficits varies across this population, at least those individuals 
with moderate or severe ADHD manifest the deficits identified by the Court in Atkins. Individuals with 
severe ADHD, for example, suffer cognitive impairments, including deficits in executive and adaptive 
functioning. Erik G. Willcutt et al., Validity of the Executive Function Theory of Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: A Meta-Analytic Review, 57 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1336, 1336 
(2005). Even if IQ scores are within the normal range of the population, other executive functioning 
skills suffer. A meta-analysis of eighty-three studies (encompassing 3,734 individuals with ADHD and 
2,969 individuals without ADHD) associated ADHD with significant deficits in several executive 
functioning domains, including “response inhibition, vigilance, spatial working memory, and . . . 
measures of planning.” Id. at 1336, 1342. Other studies suggest that individuals with ADHD also 
suffer deficits in adaptive functioning and academic performance, which may be related to limitations 
in executive functioning. Cheryl Clark et al., The Relationship Between Executive Function Abilities, 
Adaptive Behaviour, and Academic Achievement in Children with Externalising Behaviour Problems, 
43 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 785, 786 (2002). 
 Individuals with ADHD also suffer impaired social competence levels and adaptive functioning 
skills. A study of adolescents with ADHD found that these adolescents suffer more limitations than 
individuals with other behavioral problems or no behavioral problems in terms of their adaptive 
communication skills and reading abilities. Id. at 791. A study examining adaptive functioning of 
children with ADHD, children with attention deficit disorder (ADD), and children with pervasive 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
896 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:859 
 
 
 
 
Individuals with these disorders often exhibit stereotyped, atypical 
behavior. These pervasive developmental disorders, alternately referred to 
as autism spectrum disorders, range from a severe form, known as autistic 
disorder, to a milder form, known as Asperger’s syndrome.202 Although 
these conditions often overlap with medically diagnosed mental 
retardation, they often do not.203  
Autism204 may severely delay or diminish one’s ability to 
 
 
developmental disorders or mild mental retardation found that adaptive functioning was well below 
average for all three groups. Mark A. Stein et al., Adaptive Skills Dysfunction in ADD and ADHD 
Children, 36 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 663, 666 (1995).  
 Defendants with ADD and ADHD have also fared poorly when raising an Atkins-based claim. In 
Howard v. State, 153 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), for example, the state’s expert witness 
testified that the defendant’s poor performance in school “stemmed solely from his attention-deficit 
disorder,” and as a result he was not mentally retarded and could not avail himself of the Atkins rule. 
Id. at 387. The defendant in State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648 (Conn. 2004), claimed it would be cruel and 
unusual punishment to execute him because of his mental disabilities, including his ADD. Id. at 714, 
735–36. The court rejected his claim, in part, because the defendant could not “point to any trend in 
[any] other jurisdictions toward exempting persons with such mental disorders from the death 
penalty.” Id. at 736. And in State v. Scott, 800 N.E.2d 1133 (Ohio 2004), the defendant used evidence 
of his ADD to raise a mental retardation claim. Id. at 1149. The court held that because the defendant’s 
IQ did not fit within the range for medically diagnosed mental retardation, he did not fit within the 
definition of mental retardation. Id. at 1151. Relying on narrow legislative classifications of mental 
retardation, courts have thereby excluded defendants with ADHD from a legal classification of mental 
retardation. 
 202. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS: PERVASIVE 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 1–2 (2004), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/ 
autism/nimhautismspectrum.pdf. 
 203. Help with Autism, Asperger’s Syndrome & Related Disorders, http://www.autism-help.org/ 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2008). Childhood disintegrative disorder is another condition that underscores the 
inequality between the legal treatment of disorders of this type and mental retardation. Childhood 
disintegrative disorder is characterized by apparently normal development, including age-appropriate 
cognitive and social behavior, for at least the first two years after birth. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
supra note 135, at 74–75. After age two, and prior to age ten, afflicted individuals experience loss in at 
least one of the following areas: expressive or receptive language, social skills or adaptive behavior, 
bowel or bladder control, play, and motor skills. Id. As a result, affected individuals suffer from 
impaired social interaction, communication deficits, restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of 
behavior, interests, and activities, including motor stereotypes and mannerisms. Id. Thus, these 
individuals share the characteristics identified by the Supreme Court in Atkins, and yet also fall outside 
medical criteria for mental retardation. 
 204. Asperger’s syndrome is a milder form of autism, but is another relevant condition involving a 
“triad” of social, communication, and restricted/stereotyped interests deficits. Barbara G. Haskins & J. 
Arturo Silva, Asperger’s Disorder and Criminal Behavior: Forensic-Psychiatric Considerations, 34 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 374, 374–75 (2006). Affected persons are unable to respond 
appropriately in social interactions, and engage in “stereotyped, excessively focused, and repetitive 
activities.” Id. at 375. The DSM-IV criteria for Asperger’s syndrome specifies that the individual must 
have “severe and sustained impairment in social interaction (Criterion A) and the development of 
restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests and activities,” that must “cause clinically 
significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 135, at 75. Recent studies suggest that individuals with Asperger’s 
syndrome appear more frequently in forensic populations than in the general public. Haskins & Silva, 
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communicate, to develop social skills, and to conform one’s conduct to the 
law. Autistic individuals are unlikely to premeditate a crime and also ill 
equipped to assist in their own defense.205 Individuals with autism are 
easily manipulated, and therefore easily enticed into criminal behavior.206 
Such individuals suffer the same grouping of deficits as the mentally 
retarded in communication, impulse control, ability to abstract from 
mistakes, and ability to understand the reactions of others, and yet are 
excluded from legislative classifications of mental retardation. 
Although nearly 70% of individuals with autism meet the medical 
diagnostic criteria for mental retardation, 30% do not.207 The increasing 
prevalence of autism in the general population, conservatively estimated at 
13 per 10,000 in the population,208 leaves a sizable group of individuals 
outside the legislative classifications of mental retardation adopted 
pursuant to Atkins. 
Autism manifests a range of developmental deficits, including: 
(1) Cognition, in that most, but not all, individuals with autism 
suffer severe intellectual dysfunction;209 
(2) Communication, including delay or nonexistent development of 
language skills; inability to converse with others; repetitive speech 
 
 
supra, at 377. The behavioral traits associated with Asperger’s syndrome may predispose afflicted 
individuals to accidental criminal behavior. See id. at 377–82.  
 The defendant in Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2006), raised Asperger’s syndrome 
as a factor for mitigating his subjection to the death penalty. Id. at 865 n.4. In an amicus brief in the 
case, More Advanced Persons with Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome (MAAP) argued the inequity of 
treating Asperger’s differently than medically diagnosed mental retardation under the Eighth 
Amendment. Brief of MAAP Services for Autism and Asperger Spectrum et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Supporting Petitioner, at 10–11, Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d 857 (No. SC04-53). The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Schoenwetter v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 587 (2006) (mem.). Other 
defendants with Asperger’s syndrome have pled guilty to avoid a death penalty trial. See Herb Frazier, 
Handyman Pleads Guilty in Tradd Street Killing in Bid to Avoid Death Penalty, POST & COURIER 
(Charleston, S.C.), July 13, 2004, at 1A.  
 205. See generally NATIONAL AUTISTIC SOCIETY, AUTISM: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROFESSIONALS, available at http://www.nas.org.uk/content/1/c4/80/67/NAS%20CJP%20Report.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2008).  
 206. Richard McNally, State Bar of Michigan, Autism and the Courts, DISABILITIES PROJECT 
NEWSLETTER, Vol. 2, Issue 1, (2005), http://www.michbar.org/programs/Disabilities_news_5.html. 
 207. Eric Fombonne, Epidemiological Surveys of Autism and Other Pervasive Developmental 
Disorders: An Update, 33 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 365, 379 (2003). 
 208. Eric Fombonne, Epidemiology of Autistic Disorder and Other Pervasive Developmental 
Disorders, 66 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 3, 4 (Supp. 10 2005). 
 209. COMMITTEE ON DISABILITY DETERMINATION FOR MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL 
RETARDATION: DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 255 (Daniel J. Reschly et 
al. eds., 2002). 
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patterns or repetitive social interactions;210 inability to understand 
simple questions, directions, and jokes;211  
(3) Behavior and Mental Health, including restricted and 
stereotyped behavioral patterns such as adherence to nonfunctional 
routines or habits of conduct;212 inability to regulate behavior, 
engaging in self-injurious behaviors; acting aggressively, 
impulsively, or inappropriately in social situations;213  
(4) Judgment, such as the inability to abstract from mistakes,214 or to 
perceive situations from the perspective of another and react 
appropriately;215 and 
(5) Adaptive Functioning, particularly in social interactions, such as 
an inability to form social bonds; delays in social interaction;216 and 
an inability to read social cues such as winks, smiles, grimaces, or 
other expressions.217  
The overlap between the diagnostic criteria for autism and mental 
retardation is plain. But there are no reported Atkins-based challenges to 
the death penalty by an autistic defendant. Nevertheless, Louisiana 
specifically provides that a diagnosis of autism is not equivalent to a 
finding of mental retardation in its legislative classification of mental 
retardation for the death penalty.218 And defendants have not been 
successful in raising autism as mitigating evidence to the death penalty 
post-Atkins. These cases make no mention of the inequity of relegating 
autism to mitigation rather than including it within a categorical 
exemption from the death penalty.219 
 
 
 210. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 135, at 70.  
 211. Id. at 66. 
 212. Id. at 71. 
 213. Id. at 67–68. 
 214. Id. at 67. 
 215. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 202, at 6–7. 
 216. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 135, at 70.  
 217. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 202, at 7. 
 218. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(2)(a) (2008); see also State v. Turner, 936 So. 
2d 89, 103 (La. 2006) (rejecting trial court’s finding that Louisiana’s mental retardation statute is 
“unconstitutionally vague, denies . . . defendant[s] compulsory process[,] and requires . . . defendant[s] 
to relinquish [their] Fifth Amendment rights”); State v. Brown, 907 So. 2d 1, 32 (La. 2005) (finding 
that defendant failed to satisfy Louisiana’s statutory requirement for mental retardation, despite brain 
damage suffered as a result of a gunshot to the eye and expert testimony that this brain damage 
deprived defendant of the “ability to make reasonable choices”). 
 219. See, e.g., Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 185 n.2, 193 (6th Cir. 2003) (where expert 
testified that defendant had a history of developmental, cognitive, and other mental disorders, and that 
his thinking at times bordered on the autistic). 
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C. Central Nervous System Dysfunction 
Central nervous system (CNS) dysfunctions arise from death or injury 
to the neurons in the brain. “A number of factors, including infectious 
agents, drugs, [or] immune status,” can influence development of, or 
injury to, the central nervous system.220 Etiology, degree, location in the 
brain, and other factors may influence the severity of the deficits.221 
Although CNS dysfunctions occur across a broad spectrum of disorders,222 
epilepsy and bacterial meningitis are explored here.  
 
 
 220. About Cerebral Palsy, Central Nervous System Dysfunction, http://www.about-cerebral-
palsy.org/definition/central-nerve-dysfunction.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).  
 221. Id.  
 222. Other conditions of the CNS may likewise meet a legal classification of mental retardation: 
1. Viral Infections. Up to 7.4 cases of viral encephalitis per 100,000 persons occur in the 
United States each year. Francisco de Assis Aquino Gondim, Viral Encephalitis, EMEDICINE, 
Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.emedicine.com/neuro/topic393.htm. Viral encephalitis can cause 
impairments in communication, impulse control, planning, and IQ. Although several different 
viruses can cause encephalitis, two of the most common ones are the HIV and Herpes zoster 
viruses. Id. at tbl.1. 
 Encephalitis caused by HIV can result in HIV dementia, which has both cognitive and 
behavioral aspects. Alex Tselis & John Booss, Behavioral Consequences of Infections of the 
Central Nervous System: With Emphasis on Viral Infections, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 289, 296 (2003). “Cognitive dysfunction in HIV dementia consists of inability to sustain 
attention, forgetfulness, and disorganization of thought.” Id. at 297. Cognitive dysfunction 
can become severe enough that individuals with HIV dementia may get lost or confused about 
such simple matters as getting groceries, or forget how to drive home. Id. Personality and 
behavior changes in individuals with HIV dementia can include withdrawal from social 
interactions, irritability, antisocial behavior, and “dependence on others for their daily 
existence.” Id.  
 Herpes zoster, the same virus that causes chicken pox, can also cause viral encephalitis. 
Although encephalitis is a rare result of infection, it can result in exactly the kind of 
impairments that the Atkins court listed as diminishing the culpability of the mentally 
retarded. Cognitively, individuals with herpes zoster encephalitis have lower IQ scores, 
exhibit memory impairment, and even dementia in some cases. Laura Hokkanen et al., 
Subcortical Type Cognitive Impairment in Herpes Zoster Encephalitis, 244 J. NEUROLOGY 
239, 239–40, 243 (1997). Behaviorally, individuals with herpes zoster encephalitis show 
impulsivity, impaired planning and behavioral control, and flat emotional affect. Id. at 242, 
244. Although the condition is treatable, not all individuals recover, even with the help of 
antiviral medication. Laura Hokkanen & Jyrki Launes, Cognitive Outcome in Acute Sporadic 
Encephalitis, 10 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY REV. 151, 157–58 (2000). 
2. Inherited Metabolic Disorders. “Inherited [metabolic disorders] affect virtually all parts of 
the nervous system.” Pieter R. Kark, Inherited Metabolic Disorders, EMEDICINE, Dec. 8, 
2006, http://www.emedicine.com/neuro/topic680.htm. Some of these disorders are fatal in 
infancy, while others are compatible with a long life when properly treated. Id. 
Phenylketonuria (PKU) is the most prominent example of a disorder that, with appropriate 
environmental intervention, can be compatible with a long life. Id. 
 Because individuals with PKU are unable to break down certain metabolites, these 
metabolites accumulate in the blood and lead to microcephaly, epilepsy, and severe mental 
retardation. Joachim Pietz, Neurological Aspects of Adult Phenylketonuria, 11 CURRENT 
OPINION NEUROLOGY 679, 679 (1998). Neonatal screening identifies most individuals with 
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1. Epilepsy 
Nearly 1% of the general population suffers from active epilepsy, “a 
disorder characterized by the occurrence of at least 2 unprovoked seizures 
24 hours apart.”223 Mental retardation often accompanies epilepsy, with a 
comorbidity rate of 35–40% of children with epilepsy.224 But for the 60–
65% of children who do not experience comorbidity with medically 
diagnosed mental retardation, or for those who suffer adult-onset epilepsy, 
Atkins protection is unavailable. Condition deficits occur in: 
(1) Cognition, including cognitive arrest or regression as a result of 
seizures.225 A study of treatment modalities examined the entire 
population of a residential facility that provided long-term treatment 
for epilepsy.226 670 of the 677 patients with epilepsy suffered some 
form of intellectual disability.227 13% of that group had borderline 
IQ or learning disabilities.228 The remainder of intellectually 
disabled patients suffered from mild, moderate, severe, or profound 
mental disabilities.229 Epilepsy also impairs executive functioning, 
particularly in children with frontal lobe epilepsy (FLE).  
(2) Communication, including language and communication 
dysfunction, confrontational naming impairments, and impaired 
discourse production;230 
 
 
PKU in the United States, enabling the use of a restrictive diet to prevent the ingestion of the 
metabolites that these individuals are unable to break down. Id. However, in the undiagnosed 
case, or in cases where dietary treatment has been discontinued, severe neurological 
deterioration, similar to that in untreated individuals, may occur. Id. at 682. Consequently, 
adults with PKU who are unable to continue a restrictive diet may witness decay in their 
cognitive, communication, and adaptive abilities. Id. These individuals will exhibit the same 
impairments as one medically diagnosed with mental retardation. Because their age of onset 
may occur much later than eighteen, they fall outside of the legislative classifications for 
mental retardation under Atkins. 
 223. Jose E. Cavazos, Seizures and Epilepsy: Overview and Classification, EMEDICINE, Nov. 30, 
2007, http://www.emedicine.com/neuro/topic415.htm. 
 224. Norberto Alvarez, Epilepsy in Children with Mental Retardation, EMEDICINE, Aug. 29, 2007, 
http://www.emedicine.com/neuro/topic550.htm.  
 225. Brian G.R. Neville, Reversible Disability Associated with Epilepsy, 21 BRAIN & DEV. 82, 82 
(1999). 
 226. Bernd Huber et al., Seizure Freedom with Different Therapeutic Regimens in Intellectually 
Disabled Epileptic Patients, 14 SEIZURE 381, 382 (2005). 
 227. Id. at 384. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Heather Harris Wright et al., Maintenance of Communication Abilities in Epilepsy: A 
Clinical Report, 11 J. MED. SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 157, 157 (2003). 
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(3) Behavior and Mental Health. A study comparing children with 
FLE to children with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), generalized 
epilepsy, and children without epilepsy found that children with 
FLE were deficient “on tasks assessing motor coordination, verbal 
fluency, mental flexibility, impulse control and planning;”231  
(4) Judgment, including impairments in “recognition of facial 
expressions of emotion,” in perception of fear, and in social 
judgment.232 “[D]uration of illness, rather than age of onset, 
[impacts] fear recognition deficits;”233 and 
(5) Adaptive Functioning, including severe problems in daily 
functioning, particularly in those with borderline IQ or other 
intellectual deficits.234  
No court or state legislature has included epilepsy within the legal 
classification of mental retardation, although one court has come close. 
The defendant in People v. Leonard235 suffered numerous mental 
problems, but most prominently from the epilepsy he developed as a child 
that persisted into adulthood.236 On direct appeal from his capital 
conviction and sentence, the defendant argued that his epilepsy rendered 
him “functionally indistinguishable from a mentally retarded offender.”237 
The court interpreted the defendant’s argument to be that he met the 
statutory definition of mental retardation because “he ha[d] ‘significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in 
adaptive behavior.’”238 His deficits may not have fully manifested before 
the age of eighteen, however, because he suffered additional brain damage 
with each successive attack.239 The court sidestepped the issue of whether 
this would satisfy the mental retardation statute, which required 
manifestation before age eighteen, but urged that the defendant bring the 
issue in a later habeas corpus petition.240 Other defendants with severe 
epilepsy have been sentenced to death, but with successive declines in IQ 
 
 
 231. Maria Teresa Hernandez et al., Deficits in Executive Functions and Motor Coordination in 
Children with Frontal Lobe Epilepsy, 40 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 384, 395 (2002). 
 232. Hazel J. Reynders et al., Investigation of Social and Emotion Information Processing in 
Temporal Lobe Epilepsy with Ictal Fear, 7 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 419, 425 (2005). 
 233. Id.  
 234. See, e.g., Huber et al., supra note 226, at 382. 
 235. 157 P.3d 973 (Cal. 2007). 
 236. Id. at 986–87. 
 237. Id. at 1015. 
 238. Id. at 1016. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
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and adaptive functioning have nevertheless made successful clemency 
claims to commute their sentences to life imprisonment.241 That such 
defendants must seek clemency, however, demonstrates the inequity of 
excluding them from a legal classification of mental retardation. 
2. Meningitis 
Bacterial meningitis arises from a bacterial infection that invades the 
central nervous system and disrupts cerebrovascular and cerebrospinal 
fluids.242 Although the majority of sufferers recover CNS function, some 
cases of bacterial meningitis result in severe and permanent CNS damage, 
including “sensorineural hearing loss and other cranial nerve dysfunction, 
seizure disorders, hemiplegia, ataxia, hydrocephalus, and visual 
problems.”243 A meta-analysis of nineteen studies involving 1602 children 
indicated that approximately sixteen percent of survivors “display[ed] at 
least one major adverse outcome (deafness, intellectual disability, 
epilepsy, [and] physical impairment).”244 Bacterial meningitis can strike 
either children or adults, with an estimated incidence of up to four cases 
per 100,000 adults in developed countries since the introduction of a new 
vaccine in 2000.245 
This condition can give rise to a number of relevant deficits, including:  
(1) Cognition, relative to peers “with respect to . . . verbal ability, 
motor skills, [learning difficulties,] and educational progress.”246 
Likewise, survivors of meningitis fell below developmental 
expectations with respect to executive functioning, taking longer to 
complete tasks, making more errors, displaying less organization, 
and struggling with verbal and spatial problem solving.247 
Individuals with bacterial meningitis demonstrate significant 
 
 
 241. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Document – USA (Oklahoma): Death Penalty, Garry Thomas Allen 
(May 3, 2005), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/065/2005/en/dom-AMR510652005 
en.html (noting that the Oklahoma Parole and Review Board recommended by a 4–1 vote that the 
Oklahoma governor commute the death sentence of capital defendant Gary Allen, owing in significant 
part to his epileptic condition).  
 242. Vicki Anderson et al., Cognitive and Executive Function 12 Years After Childhood Bacterial 
Meningitis: Effect of Acute Neurologic Complications and Age of Onset, 29 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 
67, 68 (2004).  
 243. Id. (citations omitted). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Michael T. Fitch & Diederik van de Beek, Emergency Diagnosis and Treatment of Adult 
Meningitis, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 191, 191 (2007).  
 246. Anderson et al., supra note 242, at 68.  
 247. Id. at 76. 
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deficits in measurements relative to peers in studies performed 
seven and twelve years after their affliction;248  
(2) Sensory Processing, including visual disorders, hearing loss or 
deafness, and other physical impairments;249  
(3) Communication, including speech and language problems;250  
(4) Behavior and Mental Health, including behavioral control 
deficits;251 and, 
(5) Adaptive Functioning, including significant behavioral 
difficulties at home and at school for children.252  
Bacterial meningitis has been, at best, mitigating evidence in the death 
penalty context. The capital case of Jordan v. State253 puts a fine point on 
the issue. The defendant sought a hearing to establish his mental 
retardation after presenting evidence that he “suffered from meningitis as a 
child which might have caused brain injury; and, that he was placed in 
special education classes in school.”254 The court denied his request on the 
grounds that  
no defendant may be adjudged mentally retarded for purposes of the 
Eighth Amendment, unless such defendant produces, at a minimum, 
an expert who expresses an opinion, to a reasonable degree of 
certainty, that . . . [t]he defendant is mentally retarded, as that term 
is defined by the American Association on Mental Retardation 
and/or The American Psychiatric Association.255 
IV. INEQUALITY AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
As Part III demonstrates, medically diagnosed mental retardation 
shares characteristics with a range of other medical diagnoses. Yet in 
Atkins, United States Supreme Court exempted only the mentally retarded 
from the death penalty and left the substantive definition of that category 
 
 
 248. Keith Grimwood et al., Twelve Year Outcomes Following Bacterial Meningitis: Further 
Evidence for Persisting Effects, 83 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 111, 114 (2000). 
 249. Anderson et al., supra note 242, at 68. 
 250. Helen Bedford et al., Meningitis in Infancy in England and Wales: Follow up at Age 5 Years, 
323 BMJ 1, 2–3 (2001). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Grimwood et al., supra note 248, at 114. 
 253. 918 So. 2d 636 (Miss. 2005). 
 254. Id. at 659. 
 255. Id. at 660 (quoting Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1029 (Miss. 2004)). 
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to state legislatures. State legislatures have in turn failed to include all 
those individuals with medically equivalent conditions. In this Part, I 
argue that doing so, while also abandoning intrajurisdictional analysis, 
puts the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in tension with the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Unlike the proportionality cases of the past, the Atkins ruling exempts 
the group at issue based on their characteristics rather than their act. In 
itself, this shift might not have had remarkable constitutional import. By 
also abandoning intrajurisdictional analysis, however, the Court eliminated 
its de facto consideration of the equality of carve-outs under the Eighth 
Amendment. Thus, until the first successful application of the Court’s 
punishment-to-culpability doctrine, the Court did not have occasion to 
consider whether its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence could create 
inequalities that might implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is both this conflict between the recent Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the Fourteenth Amendment, and also the 
potential standard of judicial review that others have missed.  
When the Court first abandoned intrajurisdictional analysis, in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma,256 the Court should have realized the remarkable 
potential of its ruling. By the time it commanded a majority for this 
approach in Atkins, it should have portended the result. The Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence has triggered the application of equal protection 
analysis to subsequent legislative classifications, as to whether similar 
treatment is being afforded to similarly situated individuals.257 Equal 
protection does not prevent the government from classifying individuals. 
But it does prohibit the government from basing those classifications on 
impermissible criteria, and from burdening the exercise of a fundamental 
right. The Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment’s ban against 
cruel and unusual punishments is one of the “guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal 
abridgment” and that are thereby “equally protected against state invasion” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.258 While the Court recognized this in 
this context of incorporation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it did so 
because of the fundamental interest at stake. The Court’s “death is 
 
 
 256. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 257. “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 258. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (emphasis added) (referring to its 
fundamental nature for purposes of incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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different”259 jurisprudence and its earlier intrajurisdictional analysis may 
support the inference that a fundamental right is likewise implicated in the 
context of Equal Protection analysis. If the mentally retarded can claim a 
fundamental right against execution, then the criteria used to classify those 
individuals would be subject to heightened or strict judicial scrutiny.260 
Such an approach makes intuitive sense: deference to state action will be 
at its lowest when the right at stake is the most precious. 261 
In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,262 the Court considered an 
analogous equal protection challenge to the Oklahoma Habitual Offender 
statute, which allowed for the sterilization of certain offenders adjudged to 
be habitual criminals.263 Oklahoma granted a specific exemption in the Act 
for “offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue 
 
 
 259. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118–19 (2004). 
 260. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 16; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (“We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education 
operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or 
implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.”); United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition 
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when 
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”); cf. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23, 26 (1989) 
(finding that age ordinance was not subject to strict scrutiny because dance hall patrons were not 
engaged in fundamental right of association guaranteed by First Amendment, but instead subject to 
rational basis review, the most relaxed and tolerant form of review). 
 261. E.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 
219–20 (1984) (holding that where strict scrutiny applies, a statute that does not both advance a 
compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available must be struck down). See also Maher 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 487 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that where a fundamental right is 
impinged upon, the statute must be justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to 
express those interests). 
 262. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 263. Id. The statute involved was Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, in effect at the 
time: 
That Act defines an “habitual criminal” as a person who, having been convicted two or more 
times for crimes “amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude,” either in an Oklahoma 
court or in a court of any other State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and 
is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution. § 173. Machinery is 
provided for the institution by the Attorney General of a proceeding against such a person in 
the Oklahoma courts for a judgment that such person shall be rendered sexually sterile. 
§§ 176, 177. . . . If the court or jury finds that the defendant is an “habitual criminal” and that 
he “may be rendered sexually sterile without deteriment [sic] to his or her general health,” 
then the court “shall render judgment to the effect that said defendant be rendered sexually 
sterile” (§ 182) by the operation of vasectomy in case of a male and of salpingectomy in case 
of a female. § 174. Only one other provision of the Act is material here, and that is § 195, 
which provides that “offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue 
acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, shall not come or be considered within the terms of 
this Act.” 
Id. at 536–37. 
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acts, embezzlement, or political offenses.”264 On review, the Court 
recognized both that the right to procreate was a fundamental one, and that 
sterilization caused irreparable injury at the hands of the state.265 The 
Court thus applied strict scrutiny to the legislature’s classification scheme 
of habitual criminals under the Equal Protection Clause, and found that the 
classification unconstitutionally discriminated between embezzlers and 
other thieves:  
Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that he who commits larceny by 
trespass or trick or fraud has biologically inheritable traits which he 
who commits embezzlement lacks. Oklahoma’s line between 
larceny by fraud and embezzlement is determined, as we have 
noted, “with reference to the time when the fraudulent intent to 
convert the property to the taker’s own use” arises. We have not the 
slightest basis for inferring that that line has any significance in 
eugenics nor that the inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat 
legal distinctions which the law has marked between those two 
offenses. In terms of fines and imprisonment the crimes of larceny 
and embezzlement rate the same under the Oklahoma code. Only 
when it comes to sterilization are the pains and penalties of the law 
different. The Equal Protection Clause would indeed be a formula 
of empty words if such conspicuously artificial lines could be 
drawn.266  
The objection in Skinner was that the legislature drew a distinction, 
without a basis in science or in law, between exempting from punishment 
those who commit embezzlement and those who commit larceny.267 The 
state did so when irreparable injury would occur—sterilization. The Court 
found that scientifically, no genetic evidence justified exempting from 
sterilizing one group and not the other.268 Legally, the two offenses were 
of the same relative severity.269 Scientifically, no evidence suggested a 
hereditary basis for larceny but not for embezzlement. Lacking any 
compelling state interest—legal or scientific—to justify differentiating 
between the two groups when the fundamental right to procreate was at 
stake, the Court struck down the statute on equal protection grounds.270 
 
 
 264. Id. at 537.  
 265. Id. at 541. 
 266. Id. at 541–42 (citation omitted). 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id.  
 269. Id. at 542. 
 270. Id. at 542–43. 
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Skinner and Eighth Amendment capital proportionality cases reveal the 
implicit form of heightened scrutiny that the Court has previously 
incorporated into the Eighth Amendment, which had ensured that similarly 
situated individuals were treated similarly. Intrajurisdicational analysis 
required that a state have a strong interest in treating similarly situated 
individuals differently to justify the imposition of the differential 
punishment at issue. In Skinner, the Court required a compelling state 
interest to differentiate between the two groups because sterilization 
implicated a fundamental right. In capital cases, the Court has treated 
death as different in kind from other forms of punishment, because of its 
severity and the finality for the life interest at stake for the defendant.271 
Consequently, if the group at issue (characterized by their criminal act) 
was subject to the death penalty while a similarly situated group (based on 
their criminal act) was not, the Court carefully scrutinized the justification 
for subjecting the former to execution. As discussed in Part I, without a 
sufficient state justification, the Court found the death penalty to be 
disproportionate and thereby cruel and unusual punishment prohibited 
under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, intrajurisdictional analysis promoted 
evenhandedness, but its role in prior cases also reveals a prohibition 
against execution that may embody a fundamental right, or at the very 
least one that the Court treats as requiring heightened review.  
Jettisoning the Eighth Amendment review of evenhandedness may now 
compel an equality inquiry into legislative classifications for categorical 
exemptions to the death penalty under the Equal Protection Clause. By 
applying heightened scrutiny to the legislative rationale for distinguishing 
between groups subject to the death penalty, and by recognizing the 
execution of the mentally retarded to be cruel and unusual punishment,272 
the lost intrajurisdictional analysis may have created a new tension 
between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court has treated 
the interest underlying the right to be free from execution as one of the 
highest order. The issue—using scientific criteria to define who will be 
entitled to the exemption from the death penalty and who will not— might 
be seen as particularly pernicious and thereby appropriately subject to 
heightened or the most searching strict judicial review.  
The history behind the Skinner opinion provides further illumination. 
The distinction may have been driven by the American Eugenics 
movement, where states sought to sterilize habitual offenders based on 
 
 
 271. Abramson, supra note 259, at 118–19. 
 272. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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scientific claims that criminality was hereditary.273 The Court stymied this 
discrimination by striking down, under strict judicial review, the scheme 
sterilizing some and not other criminals committing intrinsically the same 
quality of offense.274 According to the majority opinion, such 
discrimination is tantamount to selecting “a particular race or nationality 
for oppressive treatment.”275 The same could be argued of the current 
legislative schemes as discriminatory for defining mental retardation using 
medical or scientific evidence rather than legal criteria tailored to the 
purpose of the exemption. Individuals who have intrinsically the same 
quality of culpability based on their cognitive, behavioral and adaptive 
functioning, are subject to the death penalty, while the medically 
diagnosed mentally retarded are not. Under circumstances where a 
category has been carved out for different treatment with respect to the 
death penalty, and defined purely by scientific criteria, the claim may be 
particularly salient. Especially in cases where invidious discrimination 
arises with respect to irreparable rights, more than one clause of the 
Constitution has been implicated. 
Who will and will not be considered legally mentally retarded focuses 
the issue.276 A legal definition of mental retardation based solely on 
medical diagnostic criteria does not graft onto the constitutional purpose 
identified in Atkins of affording the mentally retarded unique protection 
under the Eighth Amendment—their lesser culpability making deterrence 
and retribution ineffective and less appropriate. Individuals who are 
legally indistinguishable from the medically mentally retarded with 
respect to the legislative purpose at issue are excluded from the 
 
 
 273. See generally VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE 
NEAR-TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS (2008); see also DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF 
EUGENICS 160, 346 n.20 (1985). 
 274. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543. 
 275. Id. at 541. 
 276. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 16, at 570.  
Classifications can relate to government “ends” in any one of five ways, any one of which 
may be determined to be constitutional or unconstitutional depending on the nature of the 
legislation in the specific case. First, the classification could be perfect in that it treats all 
similar persons in a similar manner. Second, the classification could be totally imperfect in 
that it selects exactly the wrong class for a burden or a benefit while excluding the class of 
persons who do relate to the legitimate purpose of the statute. Third, the classification can be 
under-inclusive in that it includes a small number of persons who fit the purpose of the statute 
but excludes some who are similarly situated. Fourth, the classification can be over-inclusive 
in that it treats in a similar manner not only those persons whose characteristics similarly 
relate to the purpose of the law but also some additional persons who do not share the 
legitimately distinguishing characteristic. Fifth, there can be a mixed relation of over and 
under-inclusions.  
Id. at 571 (footnote omitted). 
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classifications.277 It is possible that a sufficient state justification could 
exclude some of the conditions discussed in Part III, or that the inclusion 
of others would be appropriate, but to debate over these issues requires 
that one first concede the framework of an Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment interaction. 
Comparing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.278 to 
Atkins makes plain that this claim would be novel in its approach. In 
Cleburne, the Court struck down on rational basis review a zoning 
ordinance that denied the Cleburne Living Center a permit to build a group 
home for the mentally retarded. In doing so, the Court held the mentally 
retarded are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class, and that zoning 
rights do not touch upon a fundamental personal right.279 By contrast, if 
Atkins touches upon a fundamental right, then legislative definitions of 
mental retardation would newly allow invocation of heightened or strict 
scrutiny analysis.280  
One federal judge found strict scrutiny to be the applicable standard for 
the classification of mental retardation post-Atkins. In Walker v. True,281 
Judge Gregory wrote in his partial concurrence and dissent: “It is plain 
that ‘when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the 
Constitution,’ strict scrutiny—not rational-basis review—is warranted. . . . 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the cruel and unusual 
punishment embodied by the execution of the mentally retarded is surely a 
fundamental, personal constitutional right.”282 Judge Gregory did not 
provide a more detailed explanation as to why Atkins embodied a 
fundamental right. Perhaps the intrajurisdictional analysis and “death is 
 
 
 277. E.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994) (holding that absent a 
compelling state interest, an injunction prohibiting free speech must be struck down). 
A state may no more create an underinclusive statute, one that fails truly to promote its purported 
compelling interest, than it may create an overinclusive statute, one that encompasses more protected 
conduct than necessary to achieve its goal. In the latter circumstance, the broad scope of the statute is 
unnecessary to serve the interest, and the statute fails for that reason. In the former situation, the fact 
that allegedly harmful conduct falls outside the statute’s scope belies a governmental assertion that it 
has genuinely pursued an interest “of the highest order.” 
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 16, at 572 (“An under-inclusive classification contains all similarly situated people but 
excludes some people who are similar to them in terms of the purpose of the law.”). Any government 
classification that is so underinclusive or overinclusive as to be irrational implicates constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection.  
 278. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 279. Id. at 442–47. 
 280. See id. at 440–42 (rejecting mental retardation as a suspect class). 
 281. 399 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 282. Id. at 328 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
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different” discussion from above informs his perspective, such that he also 
believes the Court has implicitly treated the prohibition against the death 
penalty for certain groups with heightened, or strict, judicial review. 
Implicitly treating this group-wise prohibition with strict scrutiny would 
be appropriate if it embodied a fundamental right. 
The first court to address an equal protection challenge to a statutory 
definition of mental retardation, however, analyzed it on rational basis 
review. In State v. Anderson,283 the defendant challenged his capital 
sentence by claiming that the statutory definition of mental retardation in 
Louisiana violated the Equal Protection Clause. He challenged the 
inclusion of an age of onset requirement before the age of eighteen, and 
asked the Louisiana Supreme Court to apply strict scrutiny in analyzing 
his claim.284 Anderson made both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims. He argued that he could satisfy the definition of mental retardation, 
but that if he failed to do so his traumatic brain injury, which occurred at 
the age of thirty-two, caused him to now suffer the same cognitive and 
adaptive functioning deficits as those medically diagnosed as mentally 
retarded.285  
The state challenged Anderson’s Eighth Amendment claim by arguing 
that he had not been diagnosed with mental retardation before the age of 
eighteen and therefore could not satisfy the statutory criteria for mental 
retardation.286 In response to his equal protection challenge, the state 
argued that the fact his brain injury occurred after the age of eighteen was 
dispositive as to its irrelevance to a claim of mental retardation.287 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court agreed on both claims. It held that Anderson had 
failed to demonstrate that his deficits occurred before the age of 
eighteen.288 Then, relying upon City of Cleburne for support, it reasoned 
that mental retardation is not a suspect class so only rational basis review 
should apply to his equal protection challenge to the age of onset 
provision.289 Under rational basis review, the court opined, classifications 
may produce “seeming arbitrary anomalies. A normal 16-year-old who 
suffers traumatic brain damage in an automobile may receive a diagnosis 
of mental retardation while a normal 18-year-old who suffers the same 
damage in a similar manner may not, although the degree of impairment in 
 
 
 283. No. 2006-KA-2987, 2008 WL 4146364 (La. 2008). 
 284. Id. at *3. 
 285. Id. at *5. 
 286. Id. at *4. 
 287. Id. at *6. 
 288. Id. at *40. 
 289. Id. at *6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] CRUEL AND UNEQUAL PUNISHMENTS 911 
 
 
 
 
intellectual functioning and adaptive skills may be identical in both 
instances.”290  
One might disagree that even rational basis review could support such 
anomalous results, but it seems unassailable that the distinction would fail 
heightened or strict judicial review. The Anderson Court did not question 
whether the equal protection challenge to the classification scheme 
touched upon a fundamental right. If one adopts Judge Gregory’s 
perspective, and Atkins embodies a fundamental right, then strict scrutiny 
should have been applied to Anderson’s claim. Even without adopting 
Judge Gregory’s fundamental rights perspective, however, the case reveals 
that an Eighth Amendment proportionality review, stripped of 
intrajurisdictional analysis, lacks the implicit equality review it previously 
included. The Anderson court could not have reached the conclusion it did 
had it required an intrajurisdictional prong.  
Presented with an equal protection, challenge, however, equality may 
still have been at issue in Anderson. The classification scheme requires a 
different analysis under a pure Eighth Amendment review than under a 
hybrid Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment approach.291 In the former case, 
the defendant is simply raising an Eighth Amendment claim in his 
particular case; in the latter, he is challenging the legislative classification 
under Equal Protection that affects him by excluding him from the 
definition of mental retardation under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
clause. While the Eighth Amendment claim might fail alone, the hybrid 
claim, or the collision between both clauses, challenges the classification 
within the definition of who is and who is not entitled to exercise the 
prohibition against cruel and unequal punishments. Equal protection 
requires states to include all those who are similarly situated within the 
classification scheme. And if heightened or strict scrutiny review applies, 
than a mere arbitrary line based on age of onset will not suffice. Even 
under rational basis review many of the distinctions discussed in Part III 
are unlikely to survive this hybrid approach. 
 
 
 290. Id. at *7. 
 291. Another way of understanding the issue is as an implied version of Akhil Amar’s 
“intratextualism.” See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (defining the 
concept of intratextualism). Before Atkins, the Court read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
as person-neutral: “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Post-Atkins, the Court implicitly 
reads persons into the clause, “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” upon (categories of) 
persons, a word that also appears in the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus cruel and unusual punishment 
cannot be inflicted upon a category of person(s), and the state cannot deny any person(s) within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This implied reading of persons into the Eighth 
Amendment creates an implied intratextual interaction. 
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Could the Court have foreseen or forestalled the inequitable fallout 
from Atkins? At the very least, had the Court applied its proportionality 
precedents more rigorously, rather than abandoning intrajurisdictional 
analysis, it could have prevented the subsequent enactment of potentially 
unconstitutional legislative classifications of mental retardation. With its 
intrajurisdictional analysis, the Court would have compared the culpability 
of this class of offenders—the mentally retarded—with other similarly 
situated classes of individuals. Through intrajurisdictional analysis the 
Court insulated its previous punishment-to-crime proportionality cases 
against this claim by engaging in a de facto equality analysis. Had the 
Court done the same here when it shifted to punishment-to-group 
proportionality analysis it could have fashioned the group in a manner that 
avoided inequitable results. Under such a scenario, the definition of mental 
retardation would have been written in a way that gave due consideration 
to the equality consideration in the Eighth Amendment and the equality 
concerns in the Equal Protection Clause.292 Intrajurisdictional analysis 
would have enabled the Court to identify the differences that would rise to 
the level of a sufficient state interest to justify drawing distinctions 
between the groups subject to capital punishment, and thereby defined 
mental retardation in a manner that avoided likely future litigation on this 
point.293 Instead, it burdened the states with that task. 
Nevertheless, the safe harbor the Court created for states to adopt 
medical diagnostic criteria for mental retardation should not now save 
legislative schemes enacted pursuant to Atkins from subsequent legal 
challenges. Although the Court may not initially have considered the equal 
protection implications of the ruling, it will be faced with the inequity that 
has followed, undoubtedly framed in this manner. But the Court can 
prevent such inequities in future categorical exemption cases by defining 
the class entitled to exercise the new constitutional right, and doing so in 
light of the principles of equality, whether via intrajurisdictional analysis 
or by taking the constraints of equal protection into consideration.  
State legislatures can ward off potential challenges to their statutory 
schemes by adopting legal definitions of mental retardation that are broad 
enough to encompass the different etiologies leading to cognitive, 
 
 
 292. Of course, the Court could have also done so by recognizing the Eighth Amendment itself to 
have an equality principle demanding such an analysis. See generally Laurence Claus, The Anti-
discrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (2004) (arguing that the context and 
history of “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” reveals a purpose to prevent invidiously 
discriminatory punishment). 
 293. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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behavioral, or adaptive impairments, while being age of onset neutral. The 
Court may have intended such a legal definition of mental retardation in 
Atkins by its own reasoning, when it said “by definition,” the mentally 
retarded have:  
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, 
to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
understand the reactions of others. . . . [T]hey often act on impulse 
rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and . . . in group 
settings they are followers rather than leaders.294  
Using the Court’s own language, the legal definition of mental 
retardation could be fashioned to encompass relevant medical 
conditions and serve the legal purpose identified in Atkins of exempting 
the least culpable offenders from death. The following could serve as a 
legislative definition of mental retardation: 
Mental Retardation. As a result of a mental disease or defect, 
diminished capacity to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, 
to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
understand the reactions of others.  
Alternately, the Court might avoid equality concerns altogether if it were 
to decide that cases like Enmund v. Florida,295 Tison v. Arizona,296 Atkins 
v. Virginia,297 and Roper v. Simmons,298 are mere instantiations of a larger 
and more generalized category, a lesser culpability category exempt from 
the death penalty. Such a category would cut across both crimes and 
persons, and need not make reference to medical conditions. Or, if the 
Court remains concerned with leaving certain decisions in the hands of 
jurors, it could decide that some medical conditions per se satisfy the 
standard of lesser culpability. 
Unless the Court takes a generalized culpability-based approach, any 
new legislative classification of mental retardation may be subject to 
equality challenges. Rather than allow for the near quarter century of 
mayhem the Court produced between its decisions in Ford v. 
 
 
 294. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 295. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 296. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 297. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 298. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Wainwright299 and Panetti v. Quartermain,300 the Court should now correct 
the inequities that have followed from Atkins. 
Of course, the Court’s new jurisprudence has implications well beyond 
the classification of mental retardation. Any classification of persons or 
crimes the Court carves out under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause could also have inequitable results. So, for example, while the 
Court in Cleburne held that age is not a suspect class,301 in Roper v. 
Simmons it exempted from capital punishment those under eighteen years 
of age.302 This leaves open possible claims like those raised in Penry v. 
Lynaugh,303 that mental age in addition to chronological age will be 
subject to an Eighth Amendment/Fourteenth Amendment challenge. 
Similarly, should the Court’s intimation when it modified its order 
denying the rehearing of Kennedy v. Louisiana304 pan out into a holding 
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause allows different 
punishments for the same crime by civilians and military personnel, an 
equal protection challenge could follow.305 Moreover, by applying the 
Thompson reformulation in Kennedy, the Court stripped its newest 
punishment-to-crime proportionality case of intrajurisdictional analysis. 
This invites the same kind of equal protection challenge in this area of 
proportionality review. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Court shifted its Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to carve out categories 
of people for heightened protection, it introduced a new era of inequality 
whereby similarly situated individuals are treated differently for purposes 
of punishment. Rather than carefully applying its earlier proportionality 
precedent, the Court abbreviated its doctrinal analysis when it focused on 
the proportion between punishment and culpability of groups of 
individuals. When the Court made this dramatic and unremarked shift 
from punishment-to-crime to punishment-to-culpability proportionality 
analysis, it failed to consider whether doing so would create 
 
 
 299. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 300. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
 301. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).  
 302. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 303. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 304. On Petition for Rehearing, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (No. 07-343), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07relatingtoorders.html. 
 305. Id. at 3 (Statement of Kennedy, J.). 
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unconstitutional inequalities between individuals with respect to the right 
against cruel and unusual punishment. 
Had the Court undertaken an intrajurisdictional analysis between the 
culpability of the mentally retarded and similar classes of offenders—as it 
had always done in its punishment-to-crime proportionality cases, by 
comparing the punishment-to-crime ratio against other similar 
punishment-to-crime ratios in the same jurisdiction—then it may have 
averted the inequities that have followed. The Court would have had to 
define the term mental retardation in law, to discuss the relevant class of 
individuals for comparison, and consider the similarities and differences 
between mentally retarded and other similarly situated groups of 
offenders. Then, the Court may have realized the arbitrariness of using 
diagnostic criteria for mental retardation as the legal standard for 
identifying the least culpable offenders ineligible for the death penalty. It 
could have forestalled legislative enactments based on medical diagnostic 
criteria, and likewise cautioned states to consider the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when developing 
classification schemes pursuant to Atkins. 
Regrettably, the Court failed to appreciate the implications of its new 
ruling. The result has been arbitrary and unequal application of the Eighth 
Amendment to similarly situated individuals. Through the Court’s new 
jurisprudence, a new disproportionality has emerged—a capital defendant 
who suffers traumatic brain injury at age twenty-two, and exhibits all of 
the same behavioral manifestations as a medically diagnosed mentally 
retarded capital offender, can be subject to the death penalty while one 
with early onset mental retardation cannot. These legislative enactments 
are now ripe to be challenged on equal protection grounds. 
That the Court failed to recognize the potential conflict it created 
between the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the equal 
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment is unsurprising—it 
had never before succeeded in carving out classes of individuals for 
unique treatment for purposes of punishment. What is surprising is that the 
Court has continued to do so in subsequent cases, without recognizing the 
apparent interrelationship it has created between the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. This continuing failure has transformed the constitutional 
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment into a new assurance of 
cruel and unequal punishment. The time is ripe for Court to recognize its 
mistake and to realign its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
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